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ABSTRACT 
An empty creditor is a creditor who, through the use of derivatives, 
especially credit default swaps (CDSs), takes a position where she retains the 
legal rights of a creditor but has little or no economic exposure to a borrower.  
                                                
1 Research Associate, National University of Singapore – Centre for Banking & Finance Law;  
email: lawfg@nus.edu.sg. 
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Thus far, the debate on empty creditors has focused mainly on how the law 
should react to the perceived problem of empty creditors.  The debate also covers 
the prominent argument that empty creditors violate the underlying corporate 
law assumption that creditors and shareholders hold their legal rights in 
proportion to their economic exposure to a company. 
 
This article argues that the current debate is fundamentally misguided—
that empty creditors are in fact not a problem.  The article presents a theoretical 
argument suggesting that empty creditors are unlikely to be a widespread 
phenomenon.  Further, the article argues that the law has never made the 
assumption that legal rights are held in proportion to economic exposure; in 
fact, taking economic exposure into account when allocating legal rights to 
investors is contrary to fundamental principles of corporate law. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Derivatives have gone from relative obscurity—mainly of interest to 
financial practitioners, regulators, and academics—to something that has 
captured the public imagination.  CDSs in particular have acquired the image of 
not just being “financial weapons of mass destruction,”2 but also being the 
ultimate in overblown financial wizardry deprived of any social utility.  From 
magazines like The Economist3 to investors like George Soros4 and comedians 
like Jon Stewart5, the great and the good have been criticizing CDSs, sometimes 
regarding them as little more than legalized fraud.6  An interesting argument in 
the CDS debate is the so-called empty creditor hypothesis (ECH) put forward by 
professors Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black.7  At a very general level, the ECH 
                                                
2 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the 
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ 
letters/2002pdf.pdf. 
3 CDSs and Bankruptcy: No Empty Threat, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2009), http:// 
www.economist.com/node/13871164. 
4 George Soros, One Way to Stop Bear Raids, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123785310594719693. 
5 See The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: December 4, 2013—Blackstone & Codere, (Comedy 
Central broadcast on Dec. 4, 2013), http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/0g8sum/blackstone---codere. 
6 Lawrence Delevingne, Harry Markopolos: CDS Fraud Will Make Madoff Look “Small-
Time”, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/harry-markopolos-
cds-fraud-will-make-madoff-look-small-time-2009-8#ixzz3VxCbxtLb. 
7 See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 
II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030721 
[hereinafter Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions]; see also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, 
Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUROPEAN 
FIN. MGMT. 663 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications]. 
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states that derivative transactions, notably CDSs, can lead to a decoupling “of 
economic rights (to receive payment of principal and interest); contractual 
control rights (to enforce, waive, or modify the terms of the debt contract); other 
legal rights (including rights to participate in bankruptcy proceedings and to sue 
company directors and officers under securities and other laws).”8 
One of the problems associated with this decoupling is that it can lead to a 
situation where creditors may take an unnecessarily tough stance against 
borrowers.9  If a creditor has a CDS written on the debt she is owed, then she 
might be indifferent as to whether she receives payment from the borrower or 
from the CDS seller.10  For creditors, bankruptcy is costly and creditors usually 
receive less than the outstanding amount.11  Therefore, the law, so the argument 
goes, assumes that creditors have incentive to work with borrowers to avoid 
bankruptcy.12  However, with the advent of CDSs, this assumption may no 
longer be justified.13  When a borrower gets into financial difficulties and a 
creditor is fully protected through a CDS, the creditor might well choose to put 
the borrower into insolvency (thereby triggering the CDS) rather than work with 
the borrower constructively—the creditor becomes an empty creditor (a creditor 
with all the legal rights but no economic exposure to the borrower).14 
Proponents of the ECH claim that empty creditors are a major concern, 
and some are asking for immediate policy action.15  This article, on the other 
hand, will argue that empty creditors are not a significant issue.  One of the major 
problems with the current ECH debate is that it confuses two distinct issues—
the economic problem and the legal problem: 
 
• The economic problem refers to the claim that the decoupling of 
economic and legal ownership provides the wrong incentives to 
creditors (i.e. makes creditors indifferent towards the borrowers’ 
fates or even turning them against borrowers).  Essentially, the 
                                                
8 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 664 . 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Dante Altieri Marinucci, Empty Creditor Syndrome and Vivisepulture: Preventing 
Credit-Default-Swap Holders from Pushing Companies into Premature Graves by Refusing to 
Negotiate Restructurings, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1285, 1313 (Summer 2012).  “As Congress 
considers ways to increase the efficacy of Dodd-Frank, it should recognize that an adjustment to the 
regulation of the credit-default-swap market to include a protection against empty creditor syndrome 
would be valuable for our economy.”  Id. 
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economic problem deals with the issue that CDSs may lead to 
inefficiencies because incentives are distorted—i.e. 
fundamentally healthy companies may be put into bankruptcy 
even though from an economic point of view it would be more 
beneficial if they survive.16 
 
• The legal problem refers to the claim that the current legal and 
regulatory regime is based on the assumption of unity between 
economic and legal ownership, and decoupling the two may lead 
to a misfit of law and commercial practice.  The legal problem 
essentially deals with the issue that CDSs may lead to suboptimal 
outcomes because the law assumes that creditors will act one way 
when in fact they act in another way.17 
 
Some of the literature on this topic deals only with the economic problem, 
while other literature deals solely with the legal aspects.18  However, both of 
these approaches are grouped together as the ECH.19  Having the same name for 
two distinct problems is not in itself an issue as long as it is recognized that the 
two are different.  This is especially important to avoid the fallacy of claiming 
that because one problem is true or false, this makes the other problem true or 
false.  Of course, there might be overlap between the two; conceptually, 
however, it is important to keep them apart.  With regard to the economic 
problem, this paper will argue that once the interactions between creditors, 
borrowers, and CDS sellers is taken into account, it is unlikely that empty 
creditors are a significant issue.  With regard to the legal problem, this paper will 
suggest that empty creditors do not violate any of the background assumptions 
on which corporate law is built.  This article will make the case that voting rights 
are justified solely by reference to the contribution made by an investor to the 
company.  The reasons for making the investment or the incentive for an investor 
are irrelevant; therefore, it is also irrelevant if their incentives are changed due 
                                                
16 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor 
Problem, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2617 (2011) (dealing only with the economic problem); see also Yesha 
Yadav, Insider Trading in Derivatives Market, 103 GEO. L.J. 381 (2015) [hereinafter Yadav, Insider 
Trading in Derivatives Market] (dealing with the legal problem). 
19 See, e.g., Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 664.  Hu 
and Black seem to group both problems as one: “Both law and contracting practice assume that the 
elements of this package are generally bundled together.  It is assumed in particular that creditors are 
normally interested in keeping a solvent firm out of bankruptcy and (intercreditor conflicts aside) in 
maximising the value of an insolvent firm.”  Id. 
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to derivatives.  Thus, contrary to what Professor Hu, Black and other proponents 
of ECH claim, empty creditors are not a significant problem.  Basing 
shareholders’ and creditors’ voting rights (shareholders have voting rights in 
“normal” times, and creditors have voting rights in times of financial distress) 
purely on the benefit provided to the company is in stark contrast to other 
commonly proposed approaches.  For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel claim 
that shareholders have voting rights because they are the recipients of the 
residual income of the company, and as such have the right incentives.20  
Thompson and Edelman argue that voting rights are based on the propensity of 
shareholders to make the right decision.21 
A word of caution, however: this paper only deals with the ECH and not 
with any of the other issues surrounding derivatives.  In particular, this paper 
does not deal with what can be considered the macro aspects of derivatives (e.g. 
systemic risk).  Therefore, the arguments in this article should not be taken to 
suggest that there are no good reasons for regulating derivatives, merely that 
whilst there may or may not be such reasons, the ECH is not one of them.  Also, 
this paper focuses exclusively on the United States and the United Kingdom, no 
other jurisdictions. 
This paper is structured as follows: Part II will introduce the ECH 
generally, and give an overview of the current debate.22  Part III will argue that 
the current debate is confused because it does not draw a clear enough distinction 
between the economic problem and the legal problem.23  Part IV will discuss the 
economic problem associated with the ECH, arguing that if the ECH is put into 
a general framework, taking into account the interactions between borrowers, 
lenders, CDS sellers, and CDS buyers, it turns out that it is unlikely that empty 
creditors are a significant problem.24  Part V will analyse the ECH legal problem, 
suggesting that it is based on a misunderstanding of corporate law and 
insolvency law.25  Part VI will analyse some examples in which empty creditors 
allegedly cause a problem.26  Part VII will summarize the findings.27 
                                                
20 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 63–89 (1996). 
21 See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 149 
(2009).  “Shareholders are the appropriate group to monitor the board and correct errors because they 
are uniquely sensitive to the principal signal indicating a deviation of the board from its duty to the 
corporation: the market price of the corporation’s stock.”  Id. 
22 See infra Part II. 
23 See infra Part III. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part V. 
26 See infra Part VI. 
27 See infra Part VII. 
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II. THE EMPTY CREDITOR HYPOTHESIS (ECH) 
Hu and Black’s original analysis of decoupling was conducted in the 
context of shareholders and subsequently extended to creditors.28  However, this 
does not add much complexity to the debate because the principles behind empty 
creditors and ‘empty shareholders’ are the same.  As such, many of the 
arguments in relation to shareholders can be applied directly to creditors.  As Hu 
and Black write: 
Just as the conventional understanding of share ownership assumes the bundling 
of a standard set of rights and obligations, so too a traditional conception of debt 
ownership includes a standard package of economic rights (principally principal 
and interest payments), control rights, default rights, and other rights and 
obligations under contractual covenants, federal bankruptcy law, and, to a 
limited extent, state corporate law.29 
To address the problem posed by empty creditors, Hu and Black do not 
propose to ban CDSs; rather, they advocate a regime where CDS positions need 
to be disclosed30 as well as a potential system in which investor voting rights are 
adjusted on the basis of their derivatives position,31 changing share lending 
regulation,32 and changing the mechanisms of shareholder voting.33  Disclosure 
would allow companies to accurately ascertain who holds their debt and equity.34  
Voting rights based on economic interest would ensure that only persons 
interested in enhancing the value of the company would be allowed to vote.35  In 
a similar spirit, Martin and Partnoy argue that, “regulators should strongly 
consider taking away the votes of options buyers and sellers.”36  Baird and 
Rasmussen argue for specific amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.37  
Hemel argues that disclosure and changing voting rights would not adequately 
address the problems posed by empty creditors.38  He therefore calls for the 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions, supra note 7, at 728–35; see also Hu & 
Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 679–86. 
29 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 728.  Just as 
shareholders can be empty voters, so too we can have empty creditors. 
30 See, e.g., Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions, supra note 7, at 682–94. 
31 Id. at 696. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 696–97. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Shaun P. Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares 1 (Univ. of San Diego Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 6, 2004), http://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1031&context=lwps_econ. 
37 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmssuen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L. J. 648 (2010). 
38 Daniel Jacob Hemel, Comment, Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
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amendment of the definition of credit event in the ISDA Master Agreement to 
include voluntary restructuring.39  Marinucci points out that it is unlikely that 
such a change would happen voluntarily and calls for legislation to effect such a 
change.40  Yadav focuses specifically on the role that CDSs play in 
circumventing existing legislation, claiming that CDSs are a particularly useful 
tool for insider dealing.41 
On the other hand, ISDA argues that “[a]lthough appealing on the surface, 
the empty creditor hypothesis is not consistent with either the way credit default 
swaps work nor with observed behaviour in debt markets.”42  Among other 
things, ISDA points out that some claims in connection with how empty creditors 
behave in bankruptcy proceedings are wrong because they do not take into 
account the mechanism of settling CDSs (especially with regards to cash-settled 
CDSs).43  Lumsden and Fridman argue that, at least in the context of Australian 
law, no legislative change is required.44  Dombalagian sees positive elements in 
decoupling of economic and legal ownership, arguing that it can lead to better 
corporate governance in the long run.45  In a similar vein, Yadav argues that 
taking into account the actions of CDS sellers, credit protection can be positive.46  
Within the more finance-orientated literature, Danis47 and Subrahmanyam, 
Tang, and Wang48 find empirical evidence to support the ECH.  Aspeli and Iden 
find no such evidence.49  Bolton and Oehmke present a theoretical model that 
                                                
159, 165–67 (2010). 
39 Hemel, supra note 38, at 167–69.  Most CDSs are governed by the ISDA Master Agreement; 
therefore, a change in the definition of credit event could be achieved relatively easily by amending 
the ISDA Master Agreement.  Id. 
40 Marinucci, supra note 15. 
41 Yadav, Insider Tradings in Derivatives Market, supra note 18. 
42 David Mengle, The Empty Creditor Hypothesis, 3 ISDA RES. NOTES 13 (2009), 
https://www.isdadocs.org/researchnotes/pdf/ISDA-Research-Notes3.pdf. 
43 Id. at 12. 
44 Andrew Lumsden & Saul Fridman, Proxy Voting and Vote Selling, 61 KEEPING GOOD 
COMPANIES J. CHARTERED SECRETARIES AUSTL. LTD. 332 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1431222. 
45 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate Shareholder Primacy?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1236 (2009), http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/42/4/articles/42-4_ 
Dombalagian. 
pdf. 
46 Yesha Yadav, Abstract, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 VAND. L. REV. 771 
(2014), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2014/05/the-case-for-a-market-in-debt-governance/. 
47 András Danis, Do Empty Creditors Matter? Evidence from Distressed Exchange Offers, 
MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001467& 
download=yes. 
48 Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Dragon Yongjun Tang & Sarah Qian Wang, Does the Tail Wag 
the Dog? The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk (H. K. Inst. for Monetary Research, 
Working Paper No. 29, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192351. 
49 Nils Henrik Gjøstøl Aspeli & Kristoffer Riis Iden, The Empty Creditor Hypothesis: An 
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suggests that CDSs can be welfare enhancing but in equilibrium lenders may 
over-hedge.50  Ashcraft and Santos find no evidence that CDSs lower the cost of 
debt financing for average borrowers; however, there is a small positive effect 
for “transparent and safe firms.”51  In another paper, Oehmke and Zawadowski 
argue that the introduction of CDSs raises bond prices only if there is a large 
difference in liquidity and between CDSs and the underlying bonds.52  However, 
Darst and Refayet find that covered CDSs lower borrowing costs for companies, 
whereas naked CDS raise borrowing costs.53 
III. THE TWO LIMBS OF THE ECH 
The first thing that needs to be established is that the ECH does indeed 
consist of two distinct claims.  The two limbs can be summarized as follows: 
 
i) The economic problem: An “economic ownership may want to 
push a company into bankruptcy,” rather than agree to a 
restructuring, “because the bankruptcy filing will trigger a 
contractual payoff on its . . . swap position.”54 
 
ii) The legal problem: “Both loan contracts and bankruptcy laws are 
premised on the assumption that creditors are averse to downside 
risk, but otherwise have an economic interest in the company's 
success and will behave accordingly.”55 
 
The differences between these two claims seems rather self-evident.  
However, some commentators—Hu and Black included—appear to not always 
appreciate the difference between the two.  For instance, Hu and Black mix 
                                                
Empirical Study of the Effects of Credit Insurance on the Choice between Bankruptcy and Private 
Restructuring (Spring 2010) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, The Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration) (on file with NHH Brage), http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/ 
168457. 
50 Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 18. 
51 Adam B. Ashcroft & João A. C. Santos, Has the Credit Default Swap Market Lowered the 
Cost of Corporate Debt? (July 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr290.pdf. 
52 Martin Oehmke & Adam Zawadowski, Synthetic or Real? The Equilibrium Effects of Credit 
Default Swaps on Bond Markets, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 19), https:// 
www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/moehmke/papers/OehmkeZawadowskiCDSvsBonds.pdf. 
53 Matthew Darst & Ehraz Refayet, The Impact of CDS on Firm Financing and Investment: 
Borrowing Costs, Spillovers, and Default Risk (June 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271685. 
54 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 682. 
55 Id. at 683. 
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examples of creditors complaining that valuation of bankruptcy assets is too high 
(the economic problem)56 with examples of how a target company’s 
management used stock lending to gain voting rights (the legal problem) within 
an M&A transaction.57  As mentioned in the introduction, in principle there is 
nothing wrong with having the same name for both issues, as long as there is no 
confusion between them.  However, this does not always seem to be the case.  
For instance, ISDA defines the ECH as the claim that “creditors who hedge their 
exposure [to a firm] will be indifferent to [the] firm’s survival.”58  This definition 
only covers the economic problem, completely bypassing the legal problem.  
Even if ISDA’s intention was to focus solely on the economic problem, there 
should have been at least an acknowledgment that there are two limbs to the 
ECH.  Another example is Bolton and Oehmke.59  Their article deals only with 
the economic aspects of ECH, without acknowledging that their discussion is 
limited to only one part of the ECH.60  Even in their policy discussion, there is 
no mention of the legal problem.61  The problem with doing this is that one may 
draw the erroneous conclusion that because one has solved one limb of the ECH 
that the other one is not a problem either.  However, it is perfectly possible for 
the economic problem of the ECH to be an issue but the legal problem not to be 
or vice versa.  
One may be tempted to argue that the two limbs of the ECH are not really 
distinct—that the economic problem is merely a special case of the legal problem 
(i.e. it is only because the insolvency rules and corporate law are based on the 
wrong assumption that it allows creditors to exploit CDS to the detriment of the 
borrower).  However, this argument conflates the issues of changing incentives 
and how the law should deal with changing incentives.  There is, of course, 
overlap between the two, however, making the distinction is simply a helpful 
conceptual tool, nothing more and nothing less. 
IV. THE ECH AS AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM 
The ECH economic problem is that CDSs create the wrong incentives for 
creditors.62  Empty creditors are indifferent towards lenders in a socially sub-
optimal way—putting healthy companies into bankruptcy, or during bankruptcy, 
                                                
56 Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions, supra note 7, at 733. 
57 Id. at 647. 
58 Mengle, supra note 42, at 1. 
59 Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 18. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 682. 
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voting for actions that minimise rather than maximise the value of a company).63  
In the extreme, creditors may not only be indifferent towards a company, but 
may actually benefit from the company losing value.64  In totality this could be 
socially inefficient because i) bankruptcy proceedings are costly (therefore, from 
a societal point of view it should only be used if it cannot be avoided); ii) 
minimizing rather than maximizing the value of a company (in the worst case 
destroying a company) is inefficient because society as a whole has an interest 
in maximizing the value of all companies.65  To analyse the economic problem 
more effectively, it is useful to subdivide them into the following claims: i) ECH 
pre-bankruptcy: describing how creditors behave before bankruptcy; and ii) 
ECH in-bankruptcy: describing how creditors behave during bankruptcy.66  The 
ECH in-bankruptcy is rather implausible, because it fails to take into account 
how CDSs are settled.67  According to ISDA: 
Once a firm files for bankruptcy, a credit event has occurred and the credit 
default swap settlement process begins . . . . 
. . . .  Under cash settlement, which is now the standard method of credit default 
swap settlement, protection sellers pay the loss amount to buyers.  The loss 
amount is the par value of the defaulted bonds minus the value of the bonds 
determined from a settlement auction. . . .  The auction procedure includes 
safeguards, . . . to deter aggressive bidding to manipulate the auction results. . . 
.  There is no requirement for delivery of the defaulted bond.  Once settlement 
occurs, the credit default swaps on the defaulted bonds terminate so there is no 
further possibility of compensation under the contracts.68 
Therefore, it seems very unlikely that the ECH in-bankruptcy is a 
widespread problem because after a default is called, the incentives that create 
empty creditors disappear.  As it was pointed out by Baird and Rasmussen, 
“[c]redit default swaps create a moral hazard problem only before Chapter 11 
begins and then in its immediate aftermath.”69  ECH pre-bankruptcy, on the other 
hand, has some intuitive appeal.  It seems obvious that creditors who are fully 
protected through CDSs behave differently than creditors who are not.  A similar 
                                                
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Mengle, supra note 42, at 12. 
66 See Mengle, supra note 42, at 7.  A similar classification was also made by the ISDA.  Id.  
One could make the further distinction to separate empty creditors who are merely indifferent 
towards the fate of a company from creditors who benefit from a company losing value.  See id.  This 
article will however group them together as one category. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. at 12. 
69 Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 18, at 2647 (quoting Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 37). 
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argument could be made for many other financial products, such as insurance.  
In the insurance world, it is a common phenomenon that insurance changes the 
behaviour of the insured.70  However, the insurance industry has developed ways 
to either address this problem, price it in the policy, or simply refuse to offer that 
product.71  It seems counterintuitive, or at least a bit surprising, that the CDS 
industry—an industry that in 2007 had “gross notional amounts outstanding . . . 
[of] USD 60 trillion”72—would be completely oblivious to this problem. 
A. Theoretical Evidence  
In situations of conflicting intuitions, it is sometimes helpful to use a 
formal model.  A very natural objection to the ECH is to argue that CDSs that 
would turn a creditor into an empty creditor should be priced so highly that it 
would not be profitable for a lender to buy such CDSs.  It seems irrational for a 
CDS seller to sell a CDS under which he is almost certain to have to pay out.  
However, Bolton and Oehmke present a model in which empty creditors may 
happen in equilibrium.73  What follows is a short description of their model; 
however, for more details the reader is invited to consult their original article.74 
The key feature of their model is that CDSs act as a commitment device 
by the lender not to accept a low amount in debt restructuring negotiations.75  
This results in CDSs having welfare enhancing effects because they increase 
companies’ pledgeable income.76  However, in equilibrium over-hedging by 
lenders will occur.77  Thus, the overall welfare effect is ambiguous.78  The crucial 
insight for the purpose of this article is that the breakdown of negotiations 
between lender and borrower may occur in equilibrium.79  In their model, the 
CDS buyer chooses a CDS payout () of either high (   or low ( 
.80  Debt renegotiations between lender and borrower break down when the 
                                                
70 See GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 
1694–1775 15 (1999). 
71 Some insurance products that are thought of as benign nowadays faced a similar criticism as 
CDSs do today.  See id.  
72 Christian Weistroffer, Credit Default Swaps: Heading Towards a More Stable System, 
DEUTSCHE BANK RES. (Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt am Main, Ger.), Dec. 21, 2009, at 1, 
http://beta3.finance.si//upload/poopmezajebava/poopmezajebava4b30c8deea20a/deutscheCDS.pdf. 
73 Bolton & Oehmke, supra note 18. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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lender chooses; however, the cash flow (F) generated by the borrower is low 
but still positive (i.e.    > 0).81  In this situation, it would be socially 
beneficial if lender and borrower would renegotiate a debt restructuring (because 
  ), but the lender will receive a higher payout by not restructuring the debt 
and having the negotiations break down.82  In the Bolton and Oehmke model, 
under certain circumstances, it is rational for the CDS buyer to choose  even 
if the CDS is priced in an actuarial accurate way (i.e. the seller factors into the 
CDS premium that  will increase the likelihood of debt renegotiations to break 
down).83  However, the Bolton and Oehmke model makes the crucial assumption 
that CDS sellers remain passive throughout.84  When the negotiations between 
the lender and the company are about to break down, the CDS seller has two 
options.85  The CDS seller can either (i) make up the difference (i.e. provide the 
borrower with the necessary funds to cover    or (ii) buy the underlying 
debt from the borrower.86  To buy the debt, the CDS seller must offer at least 
to the lender.87  In the subsequent debt renegotiations, the CDS seller will be 
able to recover	 (where 	represents the bargaining power of the CDS 
seller), giving the CDS seller a net position of   	.88  Thus, as long 
as 	  , this is a profitable strategy.89  However, there is a lack of real 
world examples of CDS sellers actually engaging in the buying of the debt.90  
Bolton and Oehmke offer the possibility that transaction costs might be too high; 
they state:    
 It is an open question whether this—CDS sellers buying the underlying debt—
is the case because protection sellers are not taking a sufficiently active role to 
avoid inefficient defaults due to empty creditors, or whether there are other 
difficulties, such as locating the holders of the debt, that prevent this intervention 
in practice.91 
However, transaction costs are unlikely to offer a satisfactory explanation.  
After all, the CDS buyer needs to contact the CDS seller to get a payout; thus, 
                                                
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 2649. 
91 Id. 
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the reverse should also be possible.  CDS sellers know who the CDS buyers are 
when the contract is entered into, and it does not seem too costly for the CDS 
seller to maintain a register with the contact details of the CDS buyer.  The CDS 
seller could also insist on a clause in the contract that the CDS buyer must inform 
the CDS seller when debt negotiations are started, and the CDS buyer must offer 
the CDS seller the option to buy the debt before she can get a payout   These 
provisions could be implemented relatively easily; however, the fact that they 
are not commonplace suggests that something else is going on.  The problem 
with Bolton and Oehmke’s model is that they assume that setting the CDS payout 
to is credible.  However, in situations in which the CDS seller buys the 
underlying debt, the borrower knows that she will de-facto never negotiate with 
the lender but with the CDS seller instead.  Therefore, the highest possible CDS 
payout is   	, which means that   	 = 0.  This result has 
two implications.  First, it suggests why there is a lack of real world examples of 
CDS sellers buying the underlying debt.  In equilibrium, the CDS seller will be 
indifferent between buying the debt and paying out under the CDS.  If one 
assumes that there are small costs involved in buying the debt, the CDS seller is 
better off paying out under the CDS.  More importantly, for the purpose of this 
article, debt renegotiations do not break down in equilibrium.  As 
  	 the borrower has enough cash to pay the lender even in case the 
cash flow is low.  In this analysis, the purpose of CDSs is not so much to act as 
a commitment device, but to enable a low bargaining power lender to use the 
bargaining strength of a high bargaining power entity.  In this analysis, CDSs are 
nothing else but a put option on the debt (which is, of course, not a novel idea).92  
However, CDSs derive their value (or social purpose) not only from their risk 
mitigating function or ability to lower transaction costs but because they allow 
the ‘renting’ of bargaining power. 
There are at least two possible objections to this analysis: (i) one could 
argue that if this analysis was true, then it is potentially more profitable for the 
high bargaining strength institution to invest in the debt in the first place rather 
than writing CDSs; and (ii) it is implausible to assume that CDS sellers have a 
higher bargaining strength than CDS buyers, especially if one considers that the 
largest group of buyers and sellers of CDSs are the same type of institution—
banks.93  It seems more plausible to assume that on average all banks have 
                                                
92 See, e.g., Rahul Bhattacharya, A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a Proxy for a Put Option on 
the Assets of a Firm, RISK LATTE (Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.risklatte.com/Articles/Quantitative 
Finance/QF100.php. 
93 David Mengle, Head of Research, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc., Presentation at 
Federal Reserve Bank of America Financial Markets Conference, Credit Derivatives: An Overview 
45 (May 15, 2007), https://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferences/2007/financial-markets-
conference/agenda.aspx. 
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similar bargaining strength.  Also it would appear impossible for an institution 
to be a buyer and seller of CDS at the same time.  Regarding the first objection, 
there are numerous advantages for the high bargaining strength institution to sell 
the CDSs rather than to buy the debt, including that: no capital has to be 
advanced to the borrower;94 no costs are incurred for originating the loan; and 
no costs are incurred for making the loan.  The point is that CDSs allow an 
institution to use its bargaining strength without having to make a loan.  
Regarding the second objection, the analysis does not assume that the banks 
cannot have the same bargaining strength on average; one bank can have a high 
bargaining strength vis-à-vis one lender but a low bargaining strength vis-à-vis 
another lender.  For instance, a bank might find it difficult to take a tough line 
against certain lenders (e.g. lenders that give a lot of other business to the bank 
and can threaten to take that business away) but easy to be tough with lenders 
which have no other connection to the bank.  This also means that it is possible 
for a bank to be simultaneously a buyer and seller for CDS. 
Another thing to note about this analysis is that the welfare enhancing 
effect of CDSs (i.e. increasing a company’s pledgeable income) still persists, 
albeit arguably to a lesser extent.  In Bolton and Oehmke’s model, it is possible 
for the lender to choose the CDS payout of 
  .  However, according to this 
article the highest payout is 
  	.  Welfare could potentially be 
enhanced if it was possible to set to 
  This opens up the possibility for 
regulatory intervention.  However, this is just a possibility; it needs to be shown 
that it is actually worthwhile.  
Bolton and Oehmke’s model also has the weakness of being restricted to 
only two time periods.  This is a potential issue because it could be the case that 
certain lenders are concerned about not developing a reputation of behaving like 
empty creditors.  This claim gains plausibility if one considers what type of 
institution buys CDSs.  According to the British Bankers Association, the 
percentage distribution of CDSs by institution in 2006 was as follows:95 
 
Institution 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Banks* 81% 73% 67% 59% 
Insurers 7% 6% 7% 6% 
Hedge funds 3% 12% 16% 28% 
Pension funds 1% 1% 3% 2% 
Mutual funds 1% 2% 3% 2% 
                                                
94 However, if the CDS seller is a bank, then presumably it must hold capital against the CDS. 
95 Mengle, supra note 93, at 45. 
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Corporates 6% 4% 3% 2% 
Other 1% 2% 1% 1% 
 *includes securities firm 
 
 Although the share of hedge funds as CDS buyers is increasing, banks 
remain the dominant buyers.  Banks are also in the business of originating loans; 
if they take an unreasonably hard line against borrowers, they would find it 
increasingly difficult to originate loans.  This provides a natural incentive for 
banks not to behave like empty creditors. 
However, it is important to point out that the sole purpose of a CDS cannot 
be to increase the bargaining strength of the lender.  If that was the case, CDSs 
that do not include voluntary restructuring as a credit event could never exist.  
Although such CDSs are less common, they do exist.96  Therefore, other 
explanations for the existence of CDSs—such as reducing transaction costs or 
preserving the relationship between lender and borrower—must also apply.  
Lastly, Bolton and Oehmke’s model does not deal with naked CDSs or how 
naked and covered CDSs interact.  However, some caution is in order before one 
concludes that empty creditors are not a problem.  At the heart of the economic 
problem of the ECH is the notion that CDSs are something that lenders and 
borrowers cannot contract on.  In other words, the lender cannot commit that she 
will not enter into a CDS written on the borrower.  This seems to be a clear case 
of potential inefficiency: a borrower may not want the lender to enter into a CDS 
for whatever reason and be willing to pay the lender for not entering into the 
CDS.  However, it is impossible for the lender to commit to this.  This article is 
not denying that there is the potential for inefficiency; rather, the argument is 
that this potential inefficiency is unlikely to be significant enough to justify 
regulatory intervention.  After all, there are all sorts of products that the market 
does not offer, but only in a few instances is it deemed necessary to intervene.97 
B. Empirical Evidence 
Theoretical models, as per previous sections, always face the problem of 
being just that—a theoretical possibility rather than an actual description of 
reality.  Thus, it is important to analyse the empirical evidence for empty 
creditors.  Unfortunately, there is no straightforward empirical method of testing 
                                                
96 Antje Berndt, Robert A. Jarrow & ChoongOh Kang, Restructuring Risk in Credit Default 
Swaps: An Empirical Analysis, 117 STOCHASTIC PROCESSES & THEIR APPLICATIONS 1724 (2007), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304414907000889. 
97 For instance, the market does not offer an insurance product that covers the costs of bringing 
up a child in case of unwanted pregnancy, although arguably there could be demand for it.  
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the ECH.  Hu and Black acknowledge that rather than relying on thorough 
empirical analysis they “rely instead—less satisfactorily—on possibilities, 
rumours, practitioner articles (which often don’t name particular instances), and 
conversations with bankruptcy lawyers, bankruptcy judges, and other 
knowledgeable market participants.”98  One of the difficulties of testing ECH 
empirically is that historically there was no general obligation to report CDSs.99  
This makes it difficult to ascertain which creditor has CDS protection and which 
creditor does not.  Therefore, one cannot simply compare a sample of creditors 
with CDS protection to creditors without CDS protection and observe 
differences.  This point was noted by Danis: “As econometricians, we only 
observe if a firm has CDS contracts traded on its debt [the problem is that] some 
CDS investors might not be among the bondholders of the firm. In order to test 
ECH one needs to rely on proxies, which make the analysis inherently noise.”100 
ISDA argues that if the ECH were true, “one would expect that, the 
correlation between number of defaults and restructurings as a percent of 
defaults should be lower when credit default swaps are available than when they 
are not.”101  However, ISDA finds that in their entire sample period the 
correlation is 9%, but after 2003 (when according to ISDA the period of liquid 
CDSs started) the correlation jumps to 90%, which is the exact opposite of what 
one would expect if the ECH were true.102  However, ISDA itself points out that 
its data set is rather small103 and “omits any other factors that may explain the 
results.”104  Nevertheless, although ISDA’s analysis is certainly not without 
shortcomings, it lends support to the notion that the ECH is false.  
Danis conducted an empirical study of the ECH and found evidence 
supporting it105, whereas Aspeli and Iden’s empirical study found none.106  Danis 
considers a sample of "80 exchange offers, with data on 210 involved bonds."107  
This analysis is based on two important assumptions.  First, it assumes that "the 
amount of CDS protection held by bondholders is exogenous."108  Second, it 
assumes "that the CDS dummy is a good proxy variable for the CDS insurance 
                                                
98 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, supra note 7, at 679. 
99 However, this is likely to change with the implementation of Dodd-Frank Title VII and the 
EMIR in the United States and to a lesser extent the MiFID II in Europe. 
100 Danis, supra note 47, at 5. 
101 Mengle, supra note 42, at 8. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 9. 
104 Aspeli & Iden, supra note 49, at 6. 
105 Danis, supra note 47. 
106 Aspeli & Iden, supra note 49. 
107 Danis, supra note 47, at 3. 
108 Id. at 15. 
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ratio of bondholders."109  Even Danis admits that this result is only of limited use 
because of the exogeneity assumption.110  To relax this assumption, Danis uses 
“the introduction of the Big Bang protocol in April 2009 as a natural 
experiment”111 and compares the periods before and after April 2009.  Before 
April 2009, depending on the choices made by the parties, an out-of-court 
voluntary restructuring could have been included in the definition of credit event 
in the contract governing the CDSs.  After April 2009, restructuring was not a 
credit event any more under the ISDA Master Agreement for Standard North 
American Corporate transactions.112  Therefore, if the ECH is true, one would 
expect that after April 2009 empty creditors would be a more severe problem 
than before, and this is exactly what Danis has found.113  Thus, prima facie, this 
seems to support ECH.  However, implicit in Danis’s analysis is the assumption 
that restructuring before April 2009 was not only a theoretical possibility of 
triggering CDS but a realistic way to trigger the CDS.  But this was not the case.  
According to ISDA, the scenario was as follows: 
Although restructuring was a standard credit event for credit default swaps in 
North America until April 2009 (Mahadevan 2009)114 and still is in most other 
markets, out-of-court restructurings as discussed here have not triggered credit 
default swaps.  The primary reason is that the ISDA documentation provides that 
a restructuring credit event must bind all holders; the terms of the restructurings 
mentioned in this article, in contrast, were binding only on those investors that 
accepted the terms.115 
Danis’s analysis seems to conflate two distinct concepts, namely the 
existence of a clause in a contract and the effect of the clause.  He writes that 
there are “empirical observations that many CDS contracts used the Modified 
Restructuring clause prior to April 2009”116; however, the only evidence he 
shows in his paper is that, “[a]ccording to estimates by Markit, when the Big 
Bang protocol was introduced, 68.5% of North American contracts contained 
the ‘Modified Restructuring’ clause (restructurings are credit events), while 
27.1% contained the ‘No Restructuring’ clause.”117  What Danis means by “CDS 
                                                
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 21 (“The previous section assumes that the cross-sectional variation in the CDS 
dummy is exogenous.  This might be violated if there are omitted variables that explain participation 
rates in distressed exchange offers and are correlated with the CDS dummy.”) 
111 Id. at 4. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 27. 
114 Mengle, supra note 42.  
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contracts used the Modified Restructuring clause”118 is that contracts contained 
the clause rather than the clause was actually used.119  If ISDA is right, then 
restructuring was not really a credit event, even before April 2009.  Therefore, 
using the change in the definition of credit event as a natural experiment to test 
ECH, the way Danis has done, does not work.  
Aspeli and Iden test a sample of 218 distressed debt restructurings in the 
U.S. between 1995 and 2010 using Gilson’s120 sampling methodology by 
identifying financially distressed firms by their poor stock price performance.121  
Their conclusion is that:  
[f]irst and foremost, we find no evidence for [the] hypothesis . . . that the 
presence of credit default swaps on a firm’s debt reduces the likelihood of a 
successful private restructuring.  The effect of credit insurance is insignificant in 
all our regressions122  
Aspeli and Iden methodology has its shortcomings as they are ready to 
admit.  For instance, they use a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
company is a CDS reference entity and 0 if it is not.  The problem is “[t]he 
dummy variable that [they] employ in [their] regressions may simply be too 
broad a measure to pick up any effect that credit insurance has on the 
negotiations between creditors and debtors.”123  The other problem is similar to 
the one faced by Danis and is the endogeneity of the variables. To test for this, 
they use a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) estimator, and they conclude that 
“any (potential) endogeneity problems inherent in our analysis remain 
unsolved.”124  
Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang also test for the ECH and find evidence 
for it arguing that “finding is robust to controlling”125.  They “construct a model 
to predict CDS trading for individual firms.  This model allows [them] to 
measure the treatment effect of CDS inception using an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach, run a propensity score matching analysis for firms with and 
without CDS trading, and conduct a difference-in-difference estimation” finding 
                                                
118 Id. 
119 Rather than only focusing how many contracts contained a restructuring clause, the 
empirical analysis should have used the number of occasions in which restructuring triggered a CDS. 
120 Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lank, Troubled Debt Restructurings: An 
Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON 315 (1990), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/Troubled%20Debt%20Restructurings_40d4a53b-
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121 Aspeli & Iden, supra note 49, at 7. 
122 Id. at 54. 
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125 Subrahmanyam, Tang & Wang, supra note 48.  
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a “positive relationship between CDS trading and bankruptcy risk remains 
significant, even after controlling for the selection and endogeneity of CDS 
trading.”126  Their methodology is quite sophisticated, but their conclusion is not 
as clear cut as it may seem.  They find that a company’s “leverage increases 
significantly after CDS trading begins”127.  This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that CDSs increase the pledgeable income of a company.  They control for the 
increased leverage; however, they appear not to take account of the possibility 
that some risky projects could not be undertaken at all without CDSs.  Thus, 
simply controlling for leverage might not be sufficient to ensure the robustness 
of the results.  They also assume that “the market practice in CDS changed 
significantly in April 2009 due to the ‘Big Bang’ implemented by ISDA, 
including for example[,] the removal of restructuring as a standard credit 
event.”128  As argued above, this assumption may not be warranted.  Further, 
their methodology generally seems to equate the appearance of a term in a 
contract with that term actually providing a realistic option.129  Also, on 
occasions their reasoning appears circular.  They write: 
Our data do not reveal the identity of individual CDS traders.  Hence, we cannot 
directly observe the presence of individual empty creditors or their portfolio 
positions.  Consequently, we have to make do with aggregate proxies for the 
inception of CDS trading as a (noisy) proxy for the potential influence of empty 
creditors.  If we make the assumption that the presence of CDS implies a higher 
probability of empty creditors than among non-CDS firms, then our baseline 
finding is consistent with the empty creditor prediction.130 
This assumption is certainly not helpful if one denies that empty creditors 
exist.  The conclusion they reach is that CDSs lead to more bankruptcies through 
what in their terminology they describe as the “leverage”, “tough creditor” and 
“coordination failure” channels.131  As discussed, the higher leverage is also 
consistent with the hypothesis that CDSs allow more leveraged projects to be 
undertaken.  “Tougher creditors” is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
CDSs allow a low barging strength lender to “rent” the high barging strength of 
another institution.132  “Coordination failure” is at best an indirect consequence 
of CDSs.  The point to note is that even if it could be established that there is a 
                                                
126 Id. at 3. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 9. 
129 They plot the number of different restructuring clauses used in CDS contracts between the 
years 1997 and 2009.  See id. at 39.  However, as discussed in relation to the Big Bang protocol, this 
does not take into account how these clauses were actually used in practice.  
130 Id. at 22. 
131 Id. at 32. 
132 High bargaining strength institutions need to be able to signal that they are tough. 
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causal link between CDSs and bankruptcy, it does not necessarily follow that 
empty creditors are a problem.  If certain projects can only be financed if CDSs 
exist, then it somehow misses the point to classify them as empty creditors.  
Empty creditors are a problem if the dialogue between lenders and borrowers 
breaks down in circumstances where it should not have done so.  
In conclusion, the empirical evidence for the ECH is inconclusive.  
However, one can expect that with introduction of derivatives reporting 
requirements (such as those contained in Dodd Frank Title VII in the US and the 
European Market Infrastructure Directive in Europe), data on CDSs will become 
more readily available, which should lead to more advances of the econometric 
analysis of the ECH.  That being said, one should not necessarily conclude that 
derivatives reporting requirements will settle all questions regarding the ECH.  
For instance, the Bolton and Oehmke model, discussed above, suggests that in 
certain circumstances CDSs can be welfare-enhancing even if they lead to the 
breakdown of negotiations between borrower and lender.  A statistical analysis 
that simply considers whether creditors with CDS protection favour bankruptcy 
over out-of-court debt restructuring would fail to capture the ex-ante efficiency 
improvement due the CDS.  While it is very likely that there will be significantly 
improved statistical analysis of CDSs and the ECH available in the near- to mid-
future, one should not necessarily count on all questions being answered.  
On a purely intuitive level, it is also important to keep in mind the size of 
the CDS market.  As noted by Deutsche Bank “[b]etween 2002 and 2007, gross 
notional amounts outstanding grew from below USD 2 trillion to nearly USD 60 
trillion.”133  In comparison, the value of the world’s financial stock was USD 
212 trillion (USD 54 trillion equity and USD 158 trillion debt) in 2011.134  The 
important point to note is that the CDS market is rather sizable in comparison to 
financial markets in general.  This probably remains true, even if one takes into 
account that multiple CDS contracts cover the same reference entity135; 
therefore, there may be some double counting in USD 60 trillion figure.  
Nevertheless, if empty creditors are indeed such a significant problem as Hu and 
Black claim, than one would expect more evidence for it.  If the ECH was true, 
then the 30-fold increase in CDS notional between 2002 and 2007, to a level at 
which total CDS notional is larger than global equities, would be akin to a giant 
meteor hitting the markets.  Like with a giant meteor, one would expect clear 
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evidence of the impact.136 
V. THE ECH AS A LEGAL PROBLEM 
As mentioned in the introduction, even if the economic problem of the 
ECH is insignificant, it does not necessarily follow that legal problem is 
insignificant.  If it is true that current law and regulation is based on the 
assumption of unity of legal and economic rights, there may be a mismatch 
between the law and commercial practice, and this may produce suboptimal 
outcomes.  This seems to be the opinion of Hu and Black, who write:  
[D]ecoupling is occurring against the background of a corporate governance 
paradigm, contractual arrangements, equity and debt governance regimes, and 
legal rules which largely assume that shareholders and creditors hold bundled 
packages of rights and obligations. 137 
This section will refer to the above as the unity assumption: the idea that 
equity and debt governance is based on the assumption of unity of legal and 
economic rights.  This article makes two claims challenging the significance of 
the legal problem:  
 
i) The "background of a corporate governance paradigm, . . . equity 
and debt governance regimes, and legal rules"138 is not based on 
the unity assumption.  In actuality, the corporate governance 
paradigm is to treat shareholders and creditors like a ‘black box’ 
– giving shareholders and creditors rights (and obligations) 
irrespective of their idiosyncratic characteristics, including their 
economic exposure to a company.  This is because the rights the 
law gives to investors, vis-à-vis a company, are exclusively a 
function of the benefits which the investor provides to the 
company, not of the loss suffered by investors for providing this 
benefit.139  
 
ii) The law does not assume that investors in a company use their 
                                                
136 This is, of course, not to be taken as thorough analysis of CDSs, it is more an appeal to 
intuition. 
137 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS 
AND REGULATION 380 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015). 
138 Id. 
139 For instance, the law gives same rights to investors investing $1,000 in a company, 
regardless of being a billionaire with a well-diversified portfolio, or an investor whose sole asset is 
the $1,000 in such company. 
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legal rights (e.g. voting rights) to maximise the value of the 
company, in fact the law makes no assumption at all how 
investors use their legal rights.140  In the rest of this article the 
assumption that investors vote to maximise the value of the 
company will be referred to as the ‘value maximising 
assumption.’ 
 
Contrary to what Hu and Black claim, CDSs do not undermine the 
background assumptions of corporate law.  Rather, it would be contrary to the 
background assumptions of cooperate law to take an investor’s derivative 
position into account when assessing what rights she should have in the 
company.  It is important to realize what the argument in this section is and what 
it is not.  The argument is not that law should or should not change because of 
CDS141; rather, the argument is solely that decoupling of legal and economic 
interests does not violate the background assumption of corporate law. 
Hu and Black do not state exactly on what basis they claim that the law 
assumes unity of legal and economic interest.  Instead, they seem to treat it as 
self-evident.  However, one can certainly not find an explicit statement in a piece 
of legislation to that effect (and Hu and Black do not make the claim that such a 
statement can be found).  Further, it would be futile to analyse every single piece 
of corporate or financial law and check on what assumptions it is based.  In any 
case, Hu and Black probably had something different in mind when they talked 
about the background assumption of corporate law.  They likely thought 
something along the lines of a 'framework' of corporate law (i.e. a set of 
assumptions or premises that allows one to explain or derive most—if not all—
corporate law).  Therefore, the strategy this article pursues is to analyse a suitable 
framework of corporate law and this will reveal the following:  
 
i) There was never a time when investors held legal rights in the 
same proportion as their economic exposure.  This will not prove 
that law could not make this assumption, but will make it less 
likely that corporate law as based on the unity assumption.142  
 
                                                
140 The law does forbid certain people from voting (e.g. a company voting its own shares held 
in treasury) and also may put certain obligations on some shareholders (e.g. fiduciary duty for 
majority shareholders).  However, this is quite different from making a general assumption on how 
shareholders should vote. 
141 See supra Part I. 
142 This is the case because if investor indeed held their economic rights in proportion to their 
legal rights, then it would be reasonable to assume that the law assumed as much. 
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ii) The concept of ‘economic interest’ is too vague to constitute a 
useful concept for the law.  This compounds the unlikeliness that 
the law ever assumed it as the basis of corporate governance.  
 
iii) A framework in which all the rights and obligations investors 
have are exclusively a function of the benefit they provide to the 
company, enabling law to treat each investor like a ‘black box’ 
(this will be referred to as the ‘black box theory’) does a superior 
job in explaining existing equity and debt governance than other 
frameworks.  
 
 If the above claims can indeed be established than this means that the 
unity assumption and value maximising assumption were never part of the 
background assumption of corporate law.  This in turn would mean that CDS do 
not violate the background assumptions.  
Two issues must be clarified before analysing these claims.  First, there 
may be a general objection that there is no such thing as a framework for 
corporate law, that corporate law is a hotchpotch of rules, not based on any 
coherent underlying assumptions (and one could add it is a splatter-gun outcome 
of lobbying efforts by interest groups).  However, this article does not claim that 
the background assumption can explain every aspect of corporate law, only that 
it can explain key features of it.  More importantly, if it is true that there are no 
background assumptions, then it automatically follows that Hu and Black's claim 
that CDSs violate the background assumptions is false, as there are no 
assumptions that CDSs can do so.  Second, it should be noted that a substantial 
part of the discussion in this section will be based on shareholders rather than 
creditors.  This is purely because the literature in this area largely focuses on 
shareholders.  This focus on shareholders, however, does not pose any special 
problems for this article as the principles are the same for shareholders and 
creditors.  As a shorthand, sometimes the discussion will only refer to the 
shareholder rights; thus, when the subsequent discussion makes reference to 
voting rights, this means either voting rights for shareholders or voting rights for 
creditors in relation to financial restructuring or insolvency proceeding.  The 
relevant principles are the same for both (if the principles diverge this will stated 
explicitly). 
A. Was There Ever Unity Between Legal and Economic Rights? 
Hu and Black seem to take it for granted that in the past investors held 
economic rights in proportion to the legal rights and it is only due to derivatives 
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that nowadays this might not be the case anymore.143  Before delving into an 
analysis of the true historical position of legal and economic rights, it is useful 
to define what these rights are.  Hu and Black do not provide a clear definition.  
They do, however, state that "[s]ome rights [shareholders have in a company] 
are not purely monetary, including voting rights, director fiduciary duties, rights 
to bring suits and inspect corporate records, and so on."144  These rights can be 
thought of as legal rights.  Within economic rights, Hu and Black include the 
following: "dividend, liquidation, and appraisal rights under corporate law . . . 
."145  Although not precise definitions, these provide a good indication of what 
legal and economic rights are, and the differences between them.  Yet, it is quite 
clear that when Hu and Black talk about dividends as an economic right, they 
mean something wider than just receiving dividends.  For instance, if investor A 
is under an obligation to pass on all dividends he receives from a company to 
investor B, then Hu and Black would probably argue that A does not have an 
economic interest in the company anymore.  Thus, economic interest seems to 
be more like the general benefit or value that investor derives from her 
investment in the company.  This is not a precise definition, however for the 
purpose of this article it is a good enough approximation.  
The position of this article is that there never was a time when shareholders 
held economic rights in the same proportion as their legal rights.146  To 
understand this, one needs to recognise that:  
 
i) an investor can change her economic interest in a company while 
holding her legal interest constant by many other means than 
through derivatives;  
 
ii) the value that an investor derives from her investment will depend 
on her legal rights in the company as well as her own 
idiosyncratic circumstances.147  More importantly, investors 
value their investments within the context of their portfolio, and 
not in isolation.   
                                                
143 See, Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 7, at 664.  “These assumptions 
[i.e. the unity assumption] can no longer be relied on.”  Id.  This strongly indicates that Hu and Black 
think that in the past the unity assumption could be relied on, most likely because shareholders’ 
economic interests were proportionate to their legal interest. 
144 Id. at 633. 
145 Id. 
146 It is possible for an investor to hold legal and economic interest in the same proportion; 
however, if that happens, it is pure coincidence.  
147 Idiosyncratic circumstances would include things like tax position, liabilities, liquidity 
needs, risk tolerance, investment horizon, etc. 
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Both observations mean that different investors will have different legal 
interests, despite them having the same legal interest.  The first claim is relatively 
straightforward to see.  An investor who has two different financial instruments, 
has a different economic interest in each instrument than another investor who 
only holds one of these instruments (provided the two instruments are not 
perfectly correlated).  Hu and Black appear to operate under the assumption that 
the only way an investor can change her economic exposure to a company is 
through derivatives.  Yet, any financial instrument that exhibits some form of 
correlation with the fortune of the company will change the investor’s economic 
exposure to that company.  If this was not true, an investor who holds positions 
in two companies, which have returns that are perfectly negatively correlated, 
would have unity of legal and economic rights, but an investor who has all her 
savings in one company as well as a small derivatives position to protect her 
from downside risk violates the unity assumption.  This appears to be an absurd 
conclusion.  One may counter this argument by claiming that investors usually 
invest in only one company; therefore, portfolio construction is not an issue for 
most investors.  However, apart from it being probably factually wrong, this 
overlooks the fact that diversification is a fundamental aspect of investing.148  
Even if one disagrees that the value of an investment to an investor depends on 
things like tax, liquidity needs, age (in case of a natural person) to value an 
investment, it is very difficult to argue that the value of an investment is 
independent from other investments held, and most investors prefer a diversified 
portfolio to holding a single investment.  However, diversification is really just 
a different way of “hedging” individual investments.149  Hu and Black believe 
that before the advent of derivatives, there was perfect (or at least very close) 
correspondence between legal and economic interests before derivatives.  Yet 
even without derivatives the unity assumption would not be satisfied.  This 
observation also suggests why the proposal of allocating voting rights according 
to economic interest is problematic.150  This allocation would require a 
                                                
148 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, BEGINNERS' GUIDE TO ASSET ALLOCATION, DIVERSIFICATION, 
AND REBALANCING (2009), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm. 
149 For instance, an investor may invest in an oil exploration company and a renewable energy 
company to hedge the position. 
150 See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 36, at 19; see also Hu & Black, Importance and 
Extensions, supra note 7 at 735 (“Beyond disclosure, debt contracts may need to adjust to the new 
world of hedged interests, voting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on net economic 
ownership instead of gross ownership of debt, and the extra complexities in devising sensible voting 
rules may provide support for proposals to rely more on auctions.”).  However, it is important to 
point out that Hu and Black generally prefer a disclosure based solution to the empty creditor 
problem and seem to advocate changing in voting rights only in extreme circumstances.  See id. at 
734. 
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determination of each investors’ economic interest.  Hu and Black seem to think 
that this is easy because they probably assume that it is just a matter of netting 
out long and short positions.  In reality, even restricted to the relatively simple 
analysis of an investor’s portfolio, determining an investor’s economic interest 
can be very difficult.  One issue is ascertaining how two positions are correlated 
and to what extent they provide a hedge for each other.  Consider the case of an 
investor who invests in company A, an oil exploration company, and company 
B, a renewable energy company.  These two positions could exhibit some 
negative correlation and provide a hedge for another.  Thus, if voting rights are 
based on economic interest, the investor should have less voting rights in 
company B for instance.  However, how the investors voting rights should be 
reduced would depend on a complex (and probably subjective) calculation about 
the return correlation between company A and B.  The example could be further 
complicated if, for instance, the investor is based in France, the oil exploration 
company operates in the US and the renewable energy company in Germany, 
and the investor's intention is to hedge his Euro exposure by investing in 
company A, which operates in US dollars.  It would be very difficult to 
objectively ascertain the exposure the investor has to company A and the voting 
rights to which the investor is entitled.  Simply netting long and short derivatives 
positions ignores the many different ways in which hedging can be achieved.  
This means that basing voting rights on economic exposure, would be a very 
complex undertaking to the extent that it would, probably be unworkable.  
It may be the case that Hu and Black never meant to argue that in the real 
world the unity assumption was ever satisfied but rather that it was a useful legal 
fiction.  One could, for instance, argue along the following lines:  ideally, the 
law would provide rights to investor according to their economic exposure, 
because this will ensure that the voting rights will be exercised most efficiently.  
Yet, due to the reasons pointed out in the previous paragraph, this would be 
highly impractical.  Therefore, to improve efficiency, the law invented the fiction 
that legal and economic interests coincide.  This was the right assumption to 
make notwithstanding that investors used to hedge their positions because the 
hedging did not dramatically change the economic position of an investor.  In 
other words, the individual economic exposure is only slightly different with a 
diversified portfolio, but with CDSs, it is radically different.  This argument in 
favour of using the unity assumption as a legal fiction is not particularly strong.  
First, it is an open empirically questions how dramatically derivatives have 
changed the behaviour of investor as opposed to hedging by other means.  
Second, it does not explain what the benefits of making the unity assumptions 
are, and more importantly, it does not explain why the law had to assume 
anything at all.  Third, arguing that the law used the unity assumption as a fiction 
(i.e. using it as if it was true although it clearly was not), could lead one to the 
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conclusion that decoupling is not a problem for the law because the law simply 
assumed unity but never expected it to apply to reality.  In fact such a position is 
similar to one proposed by this article: the law allocates legal rights to investors 
regardless of their economic rights.  The only difference would be that in the 
latter case the law acknowledges that it does not inquire into an investor’s 
economic interests, whereas in the former case the law says that it does make 
this inquire, however, using a fiction. 
In conclusion, this section suggests that the unity assumption has never 
been satisfied, even in absence of derivatives.  Furthermore, there are no other 
good reasons that the law should use the unity assumption as a legal fiction.  It 
follows that it is unlikely that the law ever made the unity assumption.  
B.  Investor Rights Are Based on the Benefits Received by the Company 
The above section suggests that awarding legal rights in proportion to 
economic interest is undesirable because it is impractical.151  Nevertheless, 
basing rights on economic exposure is not only wrong for practical reasons, it is 
wrong in principle.  Investor rights are based on the benefit they provide to the 
company, not the loss investors incurred by providing that benefit.  Based on this 
principle, it follows that the law treats shareholders like a black box.  Thus, it 
would be contrary to fundamental assumptions of corporate law if the law were 
to take into account an investor’s economic interest.  It is therefore irrelevant 
whether such interest is changed through derivatives or otherwise.   
To make this claim, this article will use a contractual approach to corporate 
law, following the same methodology used by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and 
Professor Daniel R. Fischel in their seminal work The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law.152  It merely assumes that the contractual approach is 
appropriate and does not delve into the rationale as to why.  As a brief indication 
of the appropriateness of this approach, however, one can appeal to efficiency 
by arguing that given otherwise equal options, the law will choose the more 
efficient option.153  Applying this reasoning to the background assumptions of 
corporate law means that the law would not choose one set of assumptions if 
they lead to less efficiency than another set.  This sentiment is also echoed by 
Easterbrook and Fischel.154 
                                                
151 This is essentially because the law cannot directly observe an investor’s economic interest. 
152 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 34. 
153 There is no need at this point to define precisely what “efficiency” means; however, it is 
something along the lines of “Pareto efficiency” (i.e. no one can be made better off without making 
somebody else worse off).  
154 "The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term that prevails 
unless varied by contract.  And the background term should be the one that is either picked by 
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To assess the efficiency of the background assumption, it is useful to 
consider which principles would have been chosen in a hypothetical bargaining 
situation.  From a hypothetical bargaining situation, it seems to follow that the 
rights an investor155 has vis-à-vis a company are solely a function of the benefits 
the company receives from that investor.  Assume a group of people G with zero 
capital who aim to raise money for a project which costs $X to implement, 
generating a net discounted cash flow of $Y and $X < $Y - prima facie the 
project is worthwhile to undertake.  In order to attract investments, G needs to 
offer something in return.  To raise $X efficiently, G will offer more to an 
investor from whom they receive more as opposed to an investor from whom 
they receive less.  Although this is a trivial observation, the important point is 
that the reward that G will offer will be based on the capital provided towards 
the project, not on how much it costs the investor to provide the capital.  G would 
not care if an investor has to re-mortgage his house to raise the money, or if an 
investor is a billionaire with a large well-diversified portfolio, if they invest the 
same amount.  All that G cares about is raising $X.  One investor may invest all 
his assets into the project, another investor may only invest a fraction of her 
wealth.  However, the amount invested relative to total assets of the investor is 
irrelevant—the only relevant amount is the actual amount invested.  It would 
therefore be inefficient to distribute rights in the company according to how 
much it costs an investor to make the investment rather than the benefit the 
company receives.  Any such rule advocating this would potentially require G to 
give more rights to an investor who invested all his assets in the company than 
to the billionaire investor's investment, even if the latter's investment is larger 
than the former.  The only efficient rule, therefore, is a rule that distributes rights 
solely on the basis of the benefit received by the company. 
This may seem like a rather trivial observation, and most commentators 
would agree that this observation explains why investors usually receive income 
(be it in the form of dividends, interest or capital appreciation) in proportion to 
capital contributed.  However, more importantly, this also explains why most 
companies distribute voting rights according to capital contributed (i.e., the one-
share-one-vote rule).156  The one-share-one-vote rule ensures that a larger 
                                                
contract expressly when people get around to it or is the operational assumption of successful firms."  
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 36. 
155 For the purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to define exactly what an “investor” is; 
however, this article uses the term “investor” similar to stakeholder (e.g., shareholders, creditors, 
employees, suppliers, customer, etc.).  
156 In many jurisdictions, the one-share-one-vote rule is not mandatory (this article will explain 
later on why this is the case).  However, the one-share-one-vote rule is widely used.  See Renee B. 
Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 177, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=987488##. 
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shareholder is more likely to have a company implement her preferences than a 
smaller investor.  For instance, assume a risk-averse investor A with a portfolio 
heavily exposed to the US market.  A invested in company Z, which faces a 
decision between two projects, a low-risk project in China (that would provide a 
natural hedge for the US market) and a high-risk project in the US.  More voting 
rights for investor A makes it more likely that the Chinese project will be 
adopted, giving investor A more incentive to invest in the company in the first 
place.  Thus, it is not only efficient to distribute the income of the capital 
according to capital contributed by the investors, but it is also efficient to do the 
same for voting rights.  Voting rights are merely an additional mechanism to 
induce investments.  This also explains why corporate law protects minority 
shareholders (e.g. fraud on the minority type rules in the UK,157 or fiduciary type 
obligations on major shareholders in the US158).  A company will usually try to 
raise money not only from large investors but also from small investors.159  If a 
company offers all rights in the company to a large investor, small investors 
would be very unlikely to invest in the company.  Therefore, rules that award 
large shareholders more rights while at the same time protecting small 
shareholders (especially from their funds simply being appropriated by large 
shareholders or managers) are efficient.  The important thing to note is that large 
and small shareholders is purely determined by the amount contributed to the 
company not by the loss incurred by the investor.  The one thing the company 
will not do is to reward investors on the basis of their economic interest in the 
company.  
One may object to this analysis by arguing that it mischaracterises the 
nature of a company by focusing exclusively on the initial fundraising stage; that 
the company is usually a long-term enterprise; and that the key point of corporate 
law is the long-term management of funds entrusted by investors to the company.  
Therefore, our company G will not only be interested in raising funds, but will 
also be interested in other characteristics of the investor that make such investor 
a good “match” for G.  If a potential investor A mortgaged her house to buy the 
shares, she might be required to make monthly repayments, potentially creating 
problems. For example, imagine that there are two projects X and Y: project X 
                                                
157 See Chunyan Fan, Challenging Controlling Shareholders in UK Courts: The Substantive 
Standard of Review, DEFAULT J. 1, 4–5 n.29 (2008), http://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/ 
14458602/Paper_Chunyan_Fan.pdf; VICTOR JOFFE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: LAW, PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE    2–3 (Butterworths Law 2000). 
158 See Keith H. Berk, Scott A. Josephson & Miriam Volchenboum, Fiduciary Duties of 
Shareholders of Closely Held Corporations, ILL. B.J., March 2010, at 148 n.3, http://www.hmblaw. 
com/media/10638/isba_20-_20shareholder_20fid.pdf. 
159 Please note that, as used herein, large and small shareholders are purely determined by the 
amount contributed to the company not by the loss incurred by the investor. 
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pays out a regular monthly income stream, and project Y pays out after 10 years.  
A may well prefer X to Y although Y has a higher discounted cash flow, whereas 
the other investors may well prefer Y to X, and may be inclined to turn down A 
as an investor.  CDSs can be viewed in a similar way.  The fact that a potential 
investor is fully hedged may or may not be attractive to a company, depending 
on such company's individual circumstances.  Therefore, according to this 
argument, it is wrong to state that a rule that bases investor rights on capital 
invested as well as economic exposure is always inefficient.   
There are, however, a few counterarguments to this objection.  Most 
importantly, this argument confuses the distinction between rules that should be 
enforced by law and rules that should be left to investors to determine amongst 
themselves.  It is important to recognise that the rights the investor receives in 
the company are still ultimately based on the benefit the investor provides to the 
company.  If an investor's preferences are less compatible with the preferences 
of the other investors, then that investor simply provides the same benefits to the 
company at a higher price.  Thus, an investor’s economic exposure is only 
relevant to a company in as far as it impacts the benefit the investor provides to 
the company.  This may seem like a tautology; however, if one sees corporate 
law as the outcome of adversarial bargaining, then the relevant point of view is 
the one of the benefit provided to the company' rather than 'the costs incurred by 
the company.  The question then becomes where the dividing line is between 
rules prescribed by law and rules, which investors can determine amongst 
themselves.  This answer has been given by Easterbrook and Fischel in the idea 
that corporate law is an “economizing device”: 
Why don't law firms or corporate service bureaus or investment banks compile 
sets of terms on which corporations may be constructed?  They can peddle these 
terms and recover the cost of working through all of the problems.  Yet it is 
costly for the parties (or any private supplier of rules) to ponder unusual 
situations and dicker for the adoption of terms of any sort.  Parties or their 
surrogates must identify problems and then transact in sufficient detail to solve 
them. . . . Court systems have a comparative advantage in supplying answers to 
questions that do not occur in time to be resolved ex ante.  Common law systems 
need not answer questions unless they occur. This is an economizing device.160 
(emphasis added). 
Therefore, the relevant question is which corporate contractual terms are 
more efficiently supplied by the law and which by the parties themselves.  The 
law could, of course, provide highly complex prescriptive terms incorporating 
the economic exposure of each investor or alternatively provide high level 
                                                
160 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 35. 
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principles that deal with the economic exposure of each investor.  The first 
approach would be very complex, yielding highly intricate rules.  It is highly 
unlikely that rules made by judges or legislator would be a good substitute for 
the actual bargain among people.  The other extreme of broad legal principles 
would yield very abstract rules, and it is not clear how this would enhance 
efficiency.  Therefore, if the role of corporate law is indeed to produce standard 
terms, then it seems clear what the law should do.  The law is able to produce 
simple standard terms by focusing exclusively on the benefits provided by each 
investor and by ignoring the costs to investors.  If corporate law takes into 
account an investor’s economic interest, then the law would produce rules that 
are so complex and tailored to specific situations that they would no longer be 
standard.  Alternatively, if the law produces high-level abstract rules, they would 
no longer be efficient.  Both alternatives would defeat the main purpose of 
corporate law.  Thus, corporate law focuses on producing rules common to all 
corporate ventures (i.e. pooling of capital), all other idiosyncrasies are left the 
discretion of the parties involved. 
An additional reason why the law focuses on capital invested as the 
determining factor for investor rights is fungibility and transferability of shares 
and bonds.  Fungibility in relation to shares means each "shares of stock . . . are 
considered fungible in that each share represents the same economic interest in 
the issuer as any other share."161  This means that in order to be fungible, the 
same share (or any other financial instrument) must have the same rights 
attached regardless of who holds it162.  Furthermore, transferability of shares 
would probably be restricted if the rights attached to them would vary depending 
on the holder of the shares.163  Fungibility and transferability appear to be 
fundamental principles of corporate law, intrinsically linked to the idea that the 
only thing that matters in the determination of the legal rights an investor has 
vis-à-vis a company is the benefit that investor provides to the company.  
To conclude this section, the following can be stated:  Corporate law treats 
investors in a company like a black box.  It gives them rights and obligations vis-
à-vis a company solely based on the benefit provided, which will usually take 
                                                
161 Jack Samet, The Concept of Fungibility in Securities Laws, 27 BUS. LAW 383 (1972).  
162 The terminology here might be slightly confusing because Samet also uses the term 
“economic interest”; however, he uses it in a different way than this article uses it.  
163 This seems, however, to be an intuitive outcome.  See Peter Z. Grossman, The Market for 
Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
63 (1995).  For what Grossman calls a “traditional perspective,” see Paul Halpern, Michael 
Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 
30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980).  See also Grossman, supra, at 68 n.18 (“[Susan E. Woodward] 
argued . . . unlimited liability would impair the transferability of shares generally.”).  The discussion 
in these articles is about unlimited versus limited liability; however, the relevant principles can easily 
be extended to a general discussion of transferability of shares. 
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the form of capital164 invested, not by the cost to the investor, unless there is 
specific legal rule that says otherwise.165  The purpose of this discussion was to 
counter the argument that corporate law is based on the claim that the law 
assumes shareholders or creditors in a company hold economic rights in 
proportion to legal rights.  Therefore, Hu and Black are wrong in their claim166 
that decoupling of legal and economic rights violates a basic assumption of 
corporate law.  
C. Which Theory Fits the Facts Better? 
The previous section gives abstract reasons for a theory that precludes 
corporate law from inquiring into the economic interest of investors.  Apart from 
theoretical reasons, one should also try to ascertain if a theory has explanatory 
power.  In order to do that, this section will compare the black box theory to 
another theory of corporate law, which would allow the law to inquire into the 
economic interest of investors.  This theory is the one put forward by 
Easterbrook and Fischel in The Economic Structure of Corporate Law.167  
Easterbrook and Fischel's theory was chosen because this article uses the same 
methodology as Easterbrook and Fischel, which make both theories easily 
comparable.  Further, Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s ideas, although not without 
their critics, have achieved “largely canonical”168 status.  Lastly, and most 
importantly, Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory supports the view that the ECH is 
a very sophisticated and well thought-out manner.  Thus, arguably, if the flaws 
in their theory are highlighted, then other theories should be relatively easy to 
deal with.  
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that shareholders, or rather the group that 
receives the residual income of the firm, should have voting rights because 
receiving residual income provides the right incentive for voting.169  From this, 
it seems to follow that they should not have voting rights anymore if their 
incentives change, for instance through derivatives.  Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
theory, like the black box theory, has adversarial bargaining as its starting point.  
From there, they take the position that votes should be distributed according to 
which group has the right incentives and assume that shareholders (and by 
                                                
164 Capital is to be understood broadly, encompassing financial capital as well as other forms 
of capital for instance the provisions of services or labor. 
165 For instance, competition law may intervene and stop a shareholder from enjoying certain 
rights. 
166 Hu & Black, Importance and Extension, supra note 7, at 739.  
167 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20. 
168 Martin & Portnoy, supra note 36, at 4. 
169 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 68. 
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extension creditors) are a homogenous group170 (referred to herein as the 
“homogeneity assumption”).  Through the homogeneity assumption, all conflicts 
among shareholders disappear, and the only relevant conflicts left are those 
between different groups of stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, creditors, 
employees, managers, etc).  In addition, the homogeneity assumption means that 
the only differentiating factor among all company stakeholders is how they relate 
to the company.  It is only by assuming that the sole difference between a 
shareholder and a creditor is that the former receives the residual income of the 
company and the latter has a fixed claim that one can arrive at the conclusion 
that voting rights are based on whatever group has the best incentives for voting, 
as well as claiming that the law requires firms to maximise profits (besides their 
contrary claims earlier in their book)171.  The difference between the black box 
theory and Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory is that according to the former, there 
is no direct172 connection between incentives and voting rights, while according 
to the latter, voting rights are given to the group of persons with the right 
incentives.  From the former, follows that a change in incentives (e.g. by entering 
into a derivatives position) does not have an impact on voting rights, or any other 
rights.  From the latter, a change in incentives can potentially change the 
allocation of legal rights.  Conversely, apart from the homogeneity assumption, 
the black box theory is identical to Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory.  In 
adversarial bargaining, if all shareholders are identical, they will not care about 
the distribution of voting rights because all shareholders would expect173 their 
                                                
170 Id. at 70 (“The preferences of one class of participants are likely to be similar if not identical.  
This is true of shareholders especially, for people buy and sell in the market so that the shareholders 
of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogeneous group with respect to their desires for 
the firm . . . .  So firms with single classes of voters are likely to be firms with single objectives, and 
single-objective firms are likely to prosper relative to others.  This suggests not only why only one 
class holds the controlling votes at a time but also why the law makes no effort to require firms to 
adhere to any objective other than profit maximisation (as constrained by particular legal rules).”). 
171 “An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field 
of interesting questions one that has plagued many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it 
profit, and for whom? . . . Our response to such questions is: who cares?”  Id. at 35–36. 
172 Incentives have an indirect effect because they will determine the amount a person invests 
and the “amount of rights” a company needs to give up in order to get the investments.  However, 
the crucial difference is that in the black box theory, all preferences are revealed in the amount 
invested; therefore, subsequent changes in the shareholder’s incentives do not change voting rights 
(or any other rights).  
173 The word expected is important here because it is reasonable to assume that Easterbrook 
and Fischel meant “homogeneity of shareholders” to mean “homogeneity of preferences” only, and 
not homogeneity in how much information shareholders have.  Otherwise, they could not explain 
why shareholders would not vote the same way every single time.  However, if one assumes that all 
shareholders have the same preferences, are equally rationally but have different access to 
information,  and access to information is not stable and randomly distributed among shareholders, 
then it would follow that shareholders do not vote the same way every time, although they expect to 
vote the same way.  
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votes to be exercised in the same way.  Therefore, the outcome is the same 
according to the black box theory or Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory. 
D.  The Homogeneity Assumption 
Thus, the homogeneity assumption is the crucial distinguishing factor.  In 
short, if the homogeneity assumption is correct, Easterbrook and Fischel are 
right, and the ECH’s legal problem is potentially an issue.  If homogeneity does 
not apply, then Easterbrook and Fischel are wrong, and the ECH’s legal problem 
is probably not an issue.  Without the homogeneity assumption, Easterbrook and 
Fischel’s argument simply does not work.  The centrality of the homogeneity 
assumption was also noted by Martin and Partnoy,174 as well as by Easterbrook 
and Fischel’s own admission.  According to them, “[i]t is well known, however, 
that when voters hold dissimilar preferences[,] it is not possible to aggregate their 
preferences into a consistent system of choices.”175  The homogeneity 
assumption is not only central to Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory but also serves 
as the basis for justification of most theories that justify the one-vote-one-share 
rule, as was pointed out by Hayden and Bodie.176 
Before addressing the shortcomings of the homogeneity assumption, it is 
important to emphasise that Easterbrook and Fischel did not adopt this 
assumption because of a simplistic view that shareholders usually prefer more 
money than less money.  Although this is not an unreasonable assumption, it 
does not deal with shareholders’ risk attitude and time preferences.  According 
to Easterbrook and Fischel, this is not a problem because of diversification.177  
                                                
174 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 36.  
175 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20 at 69–70. 
176 Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of 
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 448 (2008) ("Critical to the success of the one-
share-one vote theory, however, is the notion that all shareholders have the same interest—namely, 
maximizing the residual value of the corporation.  Shareholder primacy theory maintains that all 
shareholders have homogeneity of interest.  Indeed, it is seen as a necessary aspect of the theory.  If 
the purpose of the corporation is to maximise the residual, then the shareholders must all agree with 
this purpose.  Otherwise, shareholders may elect directors who will pursue interests apart from 
residual wealth maximisation.  Thus, corporate law theorists have repeatedly emphasized the 
homogeneity of shareholder interests as a critical assumption of the model.”) 
177 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 29–30 (“We shall nonetheless largely 
ignore risk aversion with respect to public corporations. . . . Our rationale is simple: diversification. 
Investors who dislike risk can get rid of risk easily.  They may hold low-risk instruments (high grade 
bonds and Treasury obligations).  Investors hold equity if and only if the expected value of these 
investments beats the return available from other sources.  Holding a basket of equities enables the 
investors to realize these expected returns, free from firm specific risk (whether risk of the firm's 
business ventures or risk of managers' dishonesty).  Those who hold equity instruments may diversify 
through mutual funds or by selecting some other broad basket.  A diversified portfolio will not get 
rid of risk that goes with the market.  It will, however, essentially eliminate the risk that goes with 
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Diversification allows an investor to invest in all securities, which means that 
the only thing the investor is interested in is to maximise the overall value of all 
companies.  However, this does not address the issue of divergent risk attitudes 
among investors.  Although investors may desire companies to do well, some 
investors may be willing to take more risk than others.  This issue, though not 
explicitly discussed by Easterbrook and Fischel, can easily be addressed with the 
help of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT).178   MPT argues that all investors, 
regardless of risk appetite, should invest in the same risky portfolio179 and then 
adjust the riskiness of the portfolio by investing in a risk-free asset or by 
borrowing at the risk-free rate.180   Thus, MPT seems to supports the assumption 
that all investors are homogeneous. However, upon further analysis, it seems to 
be that either MPT does not save the homogeneity assumption, or if it does, it 
means that the ECH is not a problem.  The first problem with MPT is that it is 
not clear to what extent MPT was ever meant to be a description of reality, as it 
proved rather difficult to use it for actual investment decisions.181  Others have 
gone even further and argued that not only does MPT not match reality, MPT 
fails to model important aspects of investors’ behaviour.182  Others have 
questioned the merits of MPT because it is based on the normal (i.e. Gaussian) 
distribution.  Nassim Nicholas Taleb argued the following:  
After the stock market crash (in 1987), they rewarded two theoreticians, Harry 
Markowitz and William Sharpe, who built beautifully Platonic models on a 
Gaussian base, contributing to what is called Modern Portfolio Theory.  Simply, 
                                                
conflicts among firms and scraps over the allocation of gains and losses.  A person who holds a 
diversified portfolio has an investment in the economy as a whole and therefore wants whatever 
social or private governance rules maximise the value of all firms put together.  He is not interested 
in maximizing one firm's value if it comes out of the hide of another corporation . . . the only reason 
to care about diversification is that people who are risk averse might want a rule maximizing the 
lower bound of returns rather than maximizing the expected return, and thus social wealth.  If the 
people who do not like risk can look after themselves at low cost, then there is no remaining reason 
not to select whatever rule maximises value.  And for what it is worth, the vast majority of 
investments are held by people with diversified portfolios.”). 
178 See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FINANCE 77, 77–91. (1952). 
179 In other words, the optimal risky portfolio (which is the portfolio with the highest Sharpe 
ratio). 
180 MPT does not explicitly address the problem of diverging time preferences among investors 
(i.e. investors having different discount rates).  However, one can speculate that MPT would allow 
one to derive a portfolio similar to the optimal risky portfolio but for discount rates, where every 
investor has the same discount rate.  
181 Joshua Brodie et al., Sparse and Stable Markowitz Portfolios, 106 PNAS 12267 (2009), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/106/30/12267.full.pdf.  
182 DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 67 (2009) (“In MPT, there 
is no attempt to explain an underlying structure to price changes. Various outcomes are simply given 
probabilities.  And, unlike the [probabilistic risk assessment], if there is no history of a particular 
system-level event like a liquidity crisis, there is no way to compute the odds of it.”).  
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if you remove their Gaussian assumptions and treat prices as scalable, you are 
left with hot air.  The Nobel Committee could have tested the Sharpe and 
Markowitz models—they work like quack remedies sold on the Internet—but 
nobody in Stockholm seems to have thought about it.183 
For the purpose of this article, it is not important to analyse what the merits 
of MPT are.  The important point is that it seems unlikely that corporate law 
would base one of its central assumptions on highly abstract financial theory, 
which is not generally accepted to reflect reality.184  Further, one could argue 
that if investors would behave according to the postulates of MPT, then empty 
creditors or shareholders would not be a problem as MPT can be extended to 
incorporate short sales.185 Investors would still invest in the optimum risky 
portfolio and could still be assumed to maximise the value of all companies.  If 
MPT is true, regardless of short selling or the availability of derivatives, 
investors would all still invest in the same portfolio and adjust the risk by 
investing in a risk-free asset.  Thus, investors would still want that value of all 
companies in the economy to be maximised, which would mean that empty 
creditors would not violate a basic assumption of corporate law.  
Apart from the implausibility that the homogeneity assumption can be 
justified on theoretical grounds, Easterbrook and Fischel’s own theory becomes 
inconsistent if one assumes homogeneity.  Martin and Partnoy observed that: 
[T]he empirical fact that shares with stronger voting rights are more valuable is 
inconsistent with assumed homogeneity.  If shareholders had uniform, 
expectations, they would (correctly) assume that their colleagues would vote the 
same way they would, and hence votes would have little or no value. . . .  
Easterbrook & Fischel [note a] difference of two to four percent in value.186 
Easterbrook and Fischel cannot explain why shares without voting rights 
usually trade at a discount compared to shares with voting rights.  If investors 
were homogeneous and the purpose of voting rights was to monitor the company, 
then monitoring would provide a benefit for all shareholders in proportion to 
their shareholding.  Thus, non-voting shares would trade at the same price as 
voting shares, and the overall price of the shares would be reduced.  As stated 
                                                
183 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 
(2007).  
184Further, Markowitz published his seminal paper on MPT in 1952 and corporate law predates 
this date by quite a bit.  Thus corporate law must have somehow “known” about MPT before the 
theory was actually articulated, which is not impossible but somewhat unlikely. 
185 See Eric Zivot, Introduction to Portfolio Theory, in AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL 
FINANCE AND FINANCIAL ECONOMETRICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16), http://faculty. 
washington.edu/ezivot/econ424/introductionPortfolioTheory.pdf.  
186 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 36, at 13.  
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above, this is not what happens in reality as non-voting shares are usually trade 
at a discount.  This suggests that voting provides a benefit to shareholders vis-à-
vis other shareholders, as well as vis-à-vis other stakeholders in the company, 
which is impossible according to Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory. 
Following Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory leads to other implausible 
results too.  Easterbrook and Fische write that: 
[t]he most basic statutory rule of voting is . . . [a]ll common shares vote, all votes 
have the same weight, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there 
is some express agreement to the contrary. . . . The presumptively equal voting 
right attached to shares is, however, a logical consequence of the function of 
voting we have discussed above.187 
If Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory is correct, it would be more likely that 
the one-share-one-vote rule would be a mandatory, rather than the default rule.  
If the one-share-one-vote rule exists because shareholders have the right 
incentives, this would be true for all companies, and one would expect that the 
law would require it (and make it mandatory) for all companies.  On the other 
hand, if voting rights are understood as just another way to attract investments, 
having one-share-one-vote as the default rule, rather than a mandatory rule, is 
highly plausible.  Many companies struggle to attract investments; therefore, 
they must provide potential investors with as many incentives as possible (which 
the one share one vote rules does).  There are some instances where these 
incentives are not needed—the company may be attractive enough without the 
voting incentive.  Therefore, the law allows for flexibility to alter the one share 
one vote rule. 
Furthermore, Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory prima facie seems to 
support the rule of one-shareholder-one-vote, rather than one-share-one-vote.  If 
all shareholders have the same interest, they would all vote the same way. This 
conclusion, however, is avoided by the introduction of monitoring costs: 
[I]f the owner of 20 percent of the residual claims acquires all of the votes, his 
incentives to take steps to improve the firm (or just to make discretionary 
decisions) is only one-fifth of the value of the decisions.  The holder of the votes 
will invest too little.  And he will also have an incentive to consume excessive 
leisure and prerequisites and to engage in other behaviour that does not maximise 
profits.188 
                                                
187 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 72.  
188 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 74.  Actually, Easterbrook and Fischel seem to 
suggest that their theory works even without the introducing costs:  
Voting flows with the residual interest in the firm, and unless each element of 
the residual interest carries an equal voting right, there will be a needless 
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Easterbrook and Fischel seem to suggest that shareholders would invest 
further resources into monitoring the company until the marginal gain from 
monitoring is equal to the costs.  As large shareholders receive more in dividends 
from the company, one would expect them to do more of the monitoring.  
However, the shareholder activism,189 as well corporate governance literature,190 
suggests that large shareholders are rather bad at monitoring management, 
whereas small-determined shareholders can be quite good at it.  A theory that 
sees voting rights as just another way to induce investments allows for small 
investors to be better at monitoring a company than large investors.  
Furthermore, theories that base voting rights on the idea of shareholders 
monitoring management fail to recognize that there are other, possibly better, 
ways to monitor managers and align their interest with that of the company. 
Incentive schemes are often used to motivate managers.  Arguably, it is only in 
rare and extreme cases that managers are voted out of office—what motivates 
them more is a pay-package tied to the company’s performance.  An argument 
for voting requirements is that an incentive scheme would not prevent managers 
from fraudulently appropriating company property.  However, this does not 
explain why shareholders could not simply sue such managers in breach of their 
fiduciary duty. (It is, of course, true that, under current law, it is difficult for 
individual shareholders to sue the directors.  However, the point of the argument 
is that to question why shareholders could not be given such a right in order to 
monitor directors)  At the very least, it is not clear why voting rights are 
necessary for the preventions of breach of fiduciary duties.191  A possible 
counterargument is that the reasons why incentive schemes for managers exists 
in the first place is because of shareholder voting rights—without the threat of 
being voted out of office, directors and managers would pay themselves over-
generously rather than having remuneration based on the performance of the 
company.  However, this argument overlooks investor choice:  investors can 
always simply refuse to invest in the company.  
                                                
agency cost of management.  Those with disproportionate voting power will 
not receive shares of the residual gains or losses from new endeavors and 
arrangements commensurate with their control; as a result they will not make 
optimal decisions. 
Id.  However, it is quite clear that this is not the case, unless the idea of costs are introduced.  
189 See, for instance, the investment strategies of The Children’s Investment Fund Management, 
Carl Ichan, Third Point Management, and David Webb, to mention just a few. 
190 SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES 62, 68 (2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/ 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf. 
191 A parallel can be found in the realm of trust law, where beneficiaries of a trust normally do 
not vote for the trustees.  Nevertheless, the law does not see this as an obstacle of imposing fiduciary 
duties. 
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The previous arguments do not deny the role of shareholders in monitoring 
managers or corporate governance.  The view that voting rights are an outcome 
of adversarial bargaining is perfectly compatible with the view that the claimants 
of the residual income of the company should hold voting rights. In fact, it is 
quite likely that this would be the case.  Claimants to the residual income of a 
company have the most to gain from voting rights.  Therefore, providing this 
group with voting rights is the most efficient way for the company to allocate 
voting rights.192  Easterbrook and Fischel were right to point out that voting 
rights usually follow the residual income.  However, they got it wrong because 
they regard it as a cornerstone of voting rights.  In reality, it is just one facet of 
a more general theory that shareholders are in conflict with one another the same 
way they are in conflict with other stakeholders of a company.  
Yet, the difference between the ideas proposed in this paper and 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory should not be overstated.  The starting point of 
both theories is Adam Smith’s insight that the “extended conflict among selfish 
people produces prices that allocate resources to their best uses.”193  One 
difference is that the theory put forward in this article states that there is 
"extended conflict" among shareholders and the best way for the law to deal with 
this conflict is to not get involved.  Easterbrook and Fischel believe that it can 
be assumed that there is no conflict between shareholders, which allows them to 
argue that the law is justified in assuming that shareholders strive for the greater 
good of all shareholders.   Further, the theory put forward in this article and 
Easterbrook and Fischel's theory agree that the law does allocate rights and 
obligations to shareholders primarily on the basis of how much they invest in the 
company, ignoring the individual “costs” incurred by the investors when making 
the investment.  Easterbrook and Fischel achieve this outcome by arguing that 
all shareholders are the same, therefore their costs are proportionate to their 
investments.  On the other hand, the black box theory argues that the law simply 
refuses to investigate the individual circumstances of each investor regardless of 
whether they can be presumed to have similar interests or not. The outcome of 
both theories will be the same in many, if not most, circumstances. However, the 
key difference is that Easterbrook and Fischel open the door to the possibility 
for the law to take into account that shareholders have different interests, if it can 
be shown that as a matter of fact they do not have the same interest and that it is 
expeditiously for the law to take the divergent interests into account.  One such 
instance could be in the case of CDSs.  For Easterbrook and Fischel, the equality 
                                                
192 Providing a shareholder with voting rights will induce that shareholder to contribute more 
capital to the firm than an equivalent creditor, as voting rights for shareholders will improve the 
earning potential of a company more than voting rights for creditor.  This is known as ceteris paribus. 
193 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20.  
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of interests among shareholders is essentially presumption of fact by the law. 
This article, on the other hand, argues that it is a fundamental tenant of corporate 
law not to take into account anything beyond the investment itself. The law can, 
of course, change and start to take into account things like derivatives positions 
of investors.  However, people who argue for this change need to acknowledge 
that this would constitute a significant departure from the standard model of 
corporate law. 
The one caveat in the above discussion is that shareholders are usually 
prohibited by law from selling their voting rights without selling their shares.  
This seems to favour Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory because the black box 
theory does not provide a good reason for why vote selling should be illegal.  
Although this argument has some force, it is not as strong as it appears.  The 
landmark Delaware case of Schreiber v. Carney194 casts some doubt on how 
strongly the prohibition of vote selling is actually enshrined in the law.  The court 
held that: 
[g]iven the holdings in Ringling and Oceanic[,] it is clear that Delaware has 
discarded the presumptions against voting agreements.  Thus, under our present 
law, an agreement involving the transfer of stock voting rights without the 
transfer of ownership is not necessarily illegal and each arrangement must be 
examined in light of its object or purpose.  To hold otherwise would be to exalt 
form over substance.  As indicated in Oceanic more than the mere form of an 
agreement relating to voting must be considered and voting agreements in 
whatever form, therefore, should not be considered to be illegal per se unless the 
object or purpose is to defraud or in some way disenfranchise the other 
stockholders.  This is not to say, however, that vote-buying accomplished for 
some laudible purpose is automatically free from challenge.  Because vote-
buying is so easily susceptible of abuse it must be viewed as a voidable 
transaction subject to a test for intrinsic fairness.195 
In their analysis of Schreiber, Hayden and Bodie conclude:  
[The Delaware Chancery Court] recognized two principles behind the general 
prohibition against vote buying: (1) protecting shareholders against fraud and 
deceit, and (2) requiring shareholders to exercise their own independent 
judgment. . . . As for the independent judgment principle, its traditional 
justification was that “by requiring each stockholder to exercise his individual 
judgment as to all matters presented, [t]he security of the small stockholders is 
found in the natural disposition of each stockholder to promote the best interests 
of all, in order to promote his individual interests.” However, the court found 
that this rationale was “obsolete because it is both impracticable and impossible 
of application to modern corporations with many widely scattered stockholders.”  
                                                
194 Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982).  
195 Id. 
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Instead, the court held the loan transaction to a standard of entire fairness.196 
It appears that vote selling is a prohibition against unfairness, rather than 
an absolute prohibition.  The black box theory can explain such a prohibition.  
As mentioned above, investments need to be attracted from large investors, as 
well as from small investors; minority voting rights exist to provide for this.  
Therefore, rules such as the prohibition of fraud on the minority in the United 
Kingdom, fiduciary type obligations on major shareholders, or fairness standard 
make sense.  In a time when derivatives were less common than they are now, it 
could be the case that vote selling was primarily a tool for fraud.  Arguably, this 
is no longer case.  However, a word of caution is in order.  Some commentators 
viewed Schreiber rather negatively,197 and it may be premature to argue that the 
prohibition on vote selling is dead.  However, Schreiber does indicate that the 
vote selling prohibition is not as firmly entrenched in the law as one might think.  
E.  Normative Arguments Against the Homogeneity Assumption 
Even if it is granted that the black box theory is correct, the question 
remains as to why the law chose to adopt this framework.  In other words, why 
did the law’s evolution not involve an analysis of an investor’s wider 
circumstances?  To give a very brief answer, this article will now depart from its 
purely factual analysis to give some normative reasons.  First, as previously 
argued, treating investors like a black box is important to achieve fungibility and 
tradability of financial instruments.198  Another, and perhaps more important, 
reason is that by not inquiring into the motives of investors, the law enables 
companies to become more like a facilitating device.199  Companies are legal 
devices that can be used for many endeavours.  If the law would tell shareholders 
what to do with a company (i.e. requiring that shareholders must vote to 
maximise the value of the company), this multiplicity would be lost.  
                                                
196 Hayden & Bodie, supra note 176, at 483. 
197 See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 21, at 164–65. 
198 However, it is important to point out that a number of other theories, including Easterbrook 
and Fischel’s theory, also achieve fungibility.  
199 One can draw an analogy to the law of trusts.  James Penner in writing about trusts says that: 
The law of trusts is a pre-eminent example of the law’s facilitative function: 
the law of trusts has provided different facilities to its users over the course of 
legal history, to allow individuals to leave property otherwise than by the law 
of primogeniture, to avoid irksome feudal incidents, to avoid taxes, to set up 
business ventures, and much else, but the principal core function is to arrange 
for the structuring of beneficial interests in property in creative ways not 
permitted at common law. 
James Penner, An Untheory of the Law of Trusts, or Some Notes Towards Understanding the 
Structure of Trusts Law Doctrine, 63 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 653, 665 (2002).  
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Easterbrook and Fischel initially seem to agree that the law should leave 
investors alone to decide what to do with the company.200  However, the 
homogeneity assumption allows them advocate a system where investors are de-
facto forced to maximise wealth, according to a very limiting notion of what 
constitutes wealth.  Yet, for a theory that purports to follow Adam Smith, this 
puts the cart before the horse.  According to Adam Smith, when economic actors 
behave in a self-interested manner then they maximise the overall welfare as a 
side product.  Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory, by contrast, allows the law to 
‘force’ investors to behave in a certain way, with the justification that this is will 
result in wealth maximisation.  Some commentators seem confused and treat 
value maximisation by a company as equivalent to shareholders following their 
own preferences.  For instance, Schouten attempts to combine the insights from 
Friedrich Hayek—that the market is a system for information aggregation201—
with Condorcet’s Jury Theorem,202 applying it to voting by shareholders and 
arguing as follows: 
Moving to legal constraints, we have already seen that courts are suspicious of 
conventional vote buying because it is susceptible of abuse.  This suspicion is 
also warranted with respect to the new vote buying [i.e. decoupling of legal and 
economic rights].  In the extreme case where a shareholder uses derivatives to 
build a net short position, his interests clearly conflict with those of other 
shareholders, as he will prefer an outcome (share price decrease) that is the 
opposite from that preferred by other shareholders (share price increase).  The 
conflicted shareholder will, to use our terminology, vote insincerely.203 
However, Schouten’s argument is oblivious to the fact that Hayek’s notion 
of the market as a giant information aggregation machine only works if the price 
signal is based on the preferences of individuals.  As soon as people are required 
to make choices to maximise the greater good, and not based on what they want, 
prices lose the ability to convey information.  Again, this is not to say that Hayek 
was right or wrong.  This is only to show that requiring a company’s investors 
                                                
200 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 20, at 35–36 (“An approach that emphasizes 
the contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field of interesting questions one that has 
plagued many writers: what is the goal of the corporation?  Is it profit (and for whom)?  Social 
welfare more broadly defined? Is there anything wrong with corporate charity?  Should corporations 
try to maximise profit over the long run or the short run? Our response to such questions is: ‘Who 
Cares?’”).  
201 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 519 (1945), 
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/top20/35.4.519-530.pdf. 
202  See, e.g., Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated 
Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 617–34 (1992). 
203 Michael C. Schouten, The Mechanisms of Voting Efficiency 48-49 (Ctr. for Bus. Research, 
Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 411, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-
10/s71410-198a.pdf. 
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to vote in such a way that maximises the value of the company departs 
significantly from the idea that investors should be allowed to vote according to 
their own interests.  
Easterbrook and Fischel justify the one-share-one-vote rule by claiming it 
is efficient because it results in shareholders monitoring a company until the 
marginal costs are equal to marginal benefit.  However, in order to get 
shareholder voting within a neat marginal cost = marginal benefit framework, 
they have to make some very heroic assumptions.  In the black box theory, 
efficiency is not achieved by equating marginal costs to marginal benefit, but by 
the assumption that under normal circumstances economic actors if left to their 
own devices will produce the socially optimal outcome.    
F.  Does Corporate Law Assume That Investors Vote to Maximise the 
Value of a Company? 
Another prominent argument by proponents of the ECH is that corporate 
and insolvency law assumes that investors vote to maximise the value of the 
company. Decoupling of economic and legal interests is therefore bad because 
it makes this assumption invalid.  The argument against this notion is similar to 
that against basing voting rights on net economic exposure—namely that the law 
never made this assumption because the idea of “maximising the value of the 
company” is poorly defined.  One might argue that maximizing the value of a 
company simply means maximizing the present value of the future income 
stream of the company.  For example, if project A has a discounted future cash 
flow of Y and project B has a discounted cash flow of Z and Y > Z, then the 
shareholders or creditors would have a duty to vote for this project.  However, 
this again fails to take into account the fact that shareholders and creditors will 
assess their holdings within the context of their portfolios.   
Hayden and Bodie made a similar point in a more extreme form,204 arguing 
                                                
204 They write that: 
The notion of maximisation of portfolio value strikes at the heart of the 
shareholder primacy norm.  Under this theory, social wealth will not be 
maximised if each firm seeks to maximise returns for its own shareholders.  
Instead, social wealth depends not on the actions of individual companies, but 
on the actions of all companies in the economy.  What this means is that in 
some instances, it would be more efficient (on a societal level) for a company 
to do something that decreased its own shareholders’ wealth.  Yet directors 
would be violating their fiduciary duties if they went forward with the 
transaction, since it would harm the company’s shareholders.  This example 
demonstrates yet another axis on which shareholders split into different 
groups based on different interests. 
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 176, at 494.  
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that the director's duty to maximise the value of a company needs to be 
reconsidered.  They are correct in their premise that investors do not necessarily 
prefer to maximise a company’s future income stream;205 however, this does not 
necessarily commit one to the view that a rule requiring directors to maximise 
the value of the company ignoring shareholders should be rejected (herein, 
referred to as the “simple wealth maximizing rule”).  First, directors of a 
company do not have complete (or indeed much) information on each investor.  
Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for directors to assess the optimal risk-
return pay-offs.  Second, shareholders can select their optimal investment mix 
through diversification, which is probably better done at the investment-level 
rather than the company-level.  Third, directors would still need a way to 
aggregate competing preferences.  If they simply follow the majority 
shareholders' preference then minority investors might be put off.  Although 
there may be a superior rule than the simple wealth maximizing rule for a specific 
transaction, a case-specific determination is quite difficult and may open the 
door for the exploitation of one group of investors by another.  As such, the 
simple wealth maximizing rule may be a good compromise.  (However, the case 
may be different from small, closely-held private companies may be an 
exception.)  
Hu and Black acknowledge that the law does not generally require voting 
based on wealth maximisation.  “Shareholders can vote based on their private 
interests, even if those diverge from corporate interests . . . The freedom to vote 
to favour one's private interests is largely taken for granted, rather than seen as 
needing justification.”206  Thus, it may be tempting to conclude that neither 
shareholders nor creditors have a general duty to vote in the best interest of the 
company, and can vote any way they please (provided, of course, there is no 
other breach of duty or fraught on the minority).  However, judicial authority 
seem to suggest otherwise.  The Delaware Supreme Court in Kurz v. Holbrook 
held that “[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a decision-making 
mechanism is the premise that stockholders with economic ownership are 
expressing their collective view as to whether a particular course of action serves 
the corporate goal of stockholder wealth maximisation.”207  
This appears to conflict directly with the idea that shareholders generally 
do not have a duty to vote to maximise the value of the company, however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not see a conflict: 
                                                
205 On a very basic level, investors will differ in their risk appetite, and a statement like 
maximizing future income streams is meaningless if one does not either assume a world without risk 
or specify the risk appetite of the investor. 
206 Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions, supra note 7, at 701. 
207 Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 178 (Del. Ch., 2010). 
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These principles also do not conflict with the venerable maxim that stockholders 
can choose freely whether and how to vote, and may do so for any reason 
including “for personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice”.  Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 
(Del.1947).  The premise underlying that freedom is the alignment of economic 
interests and voting rights. The Ringling court ruled at a time when economic 
interests and voting rights were inextricably linked.208 
However, there are possible objections to the reasoning in Kurz:  
 
1. The expression “for personal profit, or determined by whims or 
caprice”209 seems to imply that shareholders are genuinely free to 
vote any way they please, rather than there being an obligation to 
maximise the value of the company.  
 
2. The judgement fails to define what wealth maximisation means. 
The judgement seems to equate wealth maximisation to 
maximising the share value.  However, this does not provide 
guidance on how a shareholder should decide between a high-
risk, high pay-out strategy and a low-risk, low pay-out strategy, 
or between a high share price now and a low share price in the 
future or vice versa.  It could be argued here that wealth 
maximisation, rather than a unique course of action requirement, 
defines a set of actions or voting options for a shareholder.   
 
3. The judgement acknowledges that agreements to vote are 
permissible.  However, the difference between a voting trust and 
the decoupling of legal and economic rights seems to be more a 
matter of degree rather than principle.  If a shareholder enters into 
a voting agreement he transfers some or all of his legal rights to 
another, but not the economic rights (i.e. legal and economic 
rights are being separated), it is not clear why this form of 
decoupling is acceptable but decoupling through CDSs is not.  
 
Nevertheless, Kurz, without a doubt supports Hu and Black’s argument.  
There are also other cases (for instance Hu discusses the Canadian TELUS 
case),210 which make explicit or implicit reference to the decoupling framework.  
                                                
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Henry T. C. Hu, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of 
Decoupling and Transparency, 70 BUS. LAW. 347, 375–81 (2015). 
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However, there is also judicial support for the arguments put forward by this 
article.211  Nevertheless, it seems to be the case that the ECH has found some 
resonance within the judiciary and thus, the law may develop in such a way as 
to incorporate the ECH.  The point to note is that the law in this area currently 
seems to be at a pivotal moment. This article only states that the law does not 
have to develop to incorporate the ECH (and that it would be better if it would 
not).  However, this article does not make a prediction about how the law will 
actually develop.  
VI.  EXAMPLES OF EMPTY CREDITORS AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
Some readers may not take easily to the idea that empty creditors are not 
a significant problem.  This may be the case not so much because they disagree 
with the arguments above, but because they feel there are too many real life 
examples where empty creditors have been an issue—there is simply too much 
smoke for there to be no fire.  The problem with this argument is that many of 
the examples given to support the ECH have very little to do with empty 
creditors.  There may be a small number of cases where decoupling of economic 
and legal interest cause a problem.  However, far from being a large-scale 
problem that requires large-scale action, the isolated problem of empty creditors 
requires incremental action, if any. 
Hu and Black attribute many of the current economic ills to the decoupling 
of economic and legal interests.  Yet, most of the examples they give are not 
related to the decoupling of economic and legal interest.  For instance, they argue 
that decoupling contributed to the housing crisis of 2008 by making negotiations 
between homeowners and lending institutions more difficult, particularly 
because homeowners could no longer negotiate directly with the lenders, as 
original lenders no longer held their interest.212  In many instances, they argue, 
the borrowers did not even know who ended up holding their debt (and in many 
                                                
211 See infra Part VI and note 176. 
212 Hu & Black, Importance and Extensions, supra note 7, at 729–30 (“The current housing 
finance crisis highlights some of the issues arising from debt decoupling. In the past, homeowners 
facing financial difficulty could try to negotiate directly with lenders for waivers and loan 
modifications.  This is harder today. Many home mortgage loans are resold by the initial lender, 
securitized, or both.  If a loan has been securitized, the effective holder of the lender’s contractual 
rights—the servicing agent for the loan that deals with the homeowner—may have limited authority 
to make accommodations—or too little economic ownership to want to do so.  The economic interest 
will often be spread among a wide range of investors, potentially around the world.  Even if these 
investors had congruent interests and often they do not because of the way the underlying obligations 
were divided into tranches—the transaction costs simply to find them would be prohibitive.  
Sometimes it can be unclear who holds the right to foreclose.”). 
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instances multiple parties held the debt).213  However, apart from the question 
whether this description is accurate, it is not an example of decoupling of legal 
and economic interest causing a problem; if anything, it is an example of 
problems caused by dispersed holdings of debt securities. This is a common 
problem, one that issuers of publicly-traded debt are very familiar with, however, 
it has nothing to do with decoupling.  Even without decoupling, it is possible to 
divide a loan into multiple slices and sell each slice with full legal and economic 
rights, creating dispersed ownership and making negotiations difficult. 214 
Arguably, if the originators of the loans had retained legal interest and only 
transferred economic interest, it would have been easier for borrowers to 
renegotiate; as the originators would have had legal power to change the loans’ 
terms.  
Further, Hu and Black argue that decoupling is a source of systemic risk 
for the financial system.215  They quote Duffie by stating: “Duffie (2007) offers 
the judgment that ‘[e]ven specialists in [CDOs] are currently ill equipped to 
measure the risks and fair valuation of tranches that are sensitive to default 
correlation’ and discusses how this might contribute to liquidity shocks.”216 
Duffie might well be correct in his claim regarding collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs).  However, Hu and Black fail to explain what sensitivity to 
default correlation has to do with decoupling.  Debt can be securitized without 
decoupling.  It may be that CDOs were at the heart of the financial crisis; 
however, apart from synthetic CDOs, securitisation does not depend on 
decoupling of economic and legal interest.  
A.  Stock Lending 
Apart from the general examples discussed above, Hu and Black posit a 
number of more concrete examples.  An individual dissection of each example 
would be too time-consuming for the purposes of this article; however, many 
examples mentioned are based on stock lending.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
                                                
213 Id. 
214 In fact, negotiations might be easier if the legal ownership is retained by one person and 
only the economic ownership is sold.  That way the owner may have to negotiate only with the holder 
of the legal interest. 
215 Hu & Black, Governance and Systemic Risk, supra note 7, at 691 (“Decoupling can 
foster other potential sources of systemic risk.  Some reflect the ways in which financial 
innovations in general can contribute to systemic risk (Hu, 1993).  These include: modelling 
errors (including underweighting low probability, large loss (‘tail’) risks, such as the loss of 
liquidity in times of market stress); buyer and seller failures to understand complex financial 
products; and new types of agency costs, both within financial institutions and between these 
institutions and their customers.”).  
216 Id. at 691. 
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spend some time on Hu and Black’s analysis of stock lending or share 
borrowing:  
An alternate empty voting strategy is known as record date capture.  This 
strategy involves borrowing shares in the stock loan market just before the record 
date and returning the shares immediately afterwards.  Under standard 
borrowing arrangements, the borrower has no economic exposure to the 
company. . . The borrower contracts with the share lender to (1) return the shares 
to the lender at any time at the election of either side, and (2) pay the lender an 
amount equal to any dividends or other distributions the borrower receives on 
the shares.  Taxes aside, this loan agreement (a 'coupled asset' in our framework) 
leaves the borrower holding votes without economic ownership, while the lender 
has economic ownership without votes. . . .  A subtle yet central aspect of these 
empty voting strategies is that they do not directly require market trading of 
shares.  Thus, they can often be carried out, rapidly and on a large scale, with 
little impact on share price.  Consider the share borrowing strategy.  The empty 
voter borrows shares, and votes simply move from the share lender to the empty 
voter.  No shares are bought or sold.217 
First, a small clarification, Hu and Black wrongly characterize how stock 
lending works by claiming that legally it does not involves a sale of shares.  In 
fact, from a legal point of view, securities lending does entail the buying and 
selling of securities: 
Securities lending describes the common market practice by which securities are 
transferred temporarily from one party (the lender) to another (the borrower) 
with the borrower obliged to return them (or equivalent securities) either on 
demand or at the end of any agreed term.  However, the word ‘lending’ is in 
some ways misleading. Under English [and Australian] law, the transaction is in 
fact an absolute transfer of title (as in a sale) against an undertaking to return 
equivalent securities.218  
More importantly, the issues that Hu and Black try to highlight have 
nothing to do with decoupling but only how one should legally define the 
relationship between lender and borrower in a stock lending transaction.  The 
relevant legal issue here is not the decoupling of legal and economic interest.  
Instead, the relevant question is at what point does a party not permitted to vote 
as a shareholder have so much control over the party that is permitted to vote 
such that the former ought to be regarded as having acquired voting rights from 
the latter.  Hu and Black address this under the heading of soft parking, arguing: 
Firms themselves can use decoupling techniques to provide insiders or other 
                                                
217 Id. at 641. 
218 JOHN C. KING, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES LENDING ASS’N, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SECURITIES LENDING (AUSTRALIA) 8 (2005), http://asla.com.au/info/LongSecLendingPaper.pdf. 
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friendly third parties with votes on the firm’s own shares, yet little or no 
economic exposure.  In doing so, firms are effectively voting their own shares.  
This vote parking is often ‘soft’ and based on informal expectations about how 
the shares will be voted. Company insiders arrange for voting ownership to be 
held by someone else, and ensure that the someone [sic.] else has incentives to 
vote pro-management.  Usually, the voteholder is not formally obliged to vote 
as management directs-that would invite disallowance of the votes under 
corporate law.  Incentives and informal understandings do the work instead. . . . 
One strategy involves the corporation acquiring economic ownership of its 
shares through an equity swap or other equity derivative, contract, say with a 
derivatives dealer or other professional friend.  In substance, the corporation has 
repurchased its own shares.219 
It is clearly a problem when a company votes its own shares, as this is 
illegal in many jurisdictions.  However, the relevant issue here is not the 
decoupling of economic and legal ownership, but that the company is able to 
influence another party to vote according to its wishes.  Hu and Black admit that 
the company only ensures “that someone [sic] else has incentives to vote pro-
management.”220  These incentives are the key issue, not decoupling.  If the 
company were party to a soft park arrangement, but had no way of influencing 
the legal interest holders, then the company could not influence the vote.  A 
company, who is party to a soft parking arrangement (or rather the directors or 
managers of such company), is usually not interested in economic ownership of 
the shares as such (i.e. the company does not seek to profit from their derivatives 
position).  What management wants are the legal rights associated with the 
shares, precisely those rights that a soft parking arrangement does not provide.  
Influence is key in this transaction; however, decoupling itself does not provide 
that influence. Hu and Black agreed with this when they write that the “dealer 
[i.e. the person who holds the voting rights] wants to stay on good terms with 
this client and preserve a reputation for treating clients well.”221 That is the 
reason why a dealer would vote their shares rights according to the wishes of the 
company.  Regardless of whether this is true or not, the key point for Hu and 
Black is that the dealer wants to stay on good terms with the company.  The 
primary effect of decoupling in a soft parking arrangement, as described by Hu 
and Black,222 is to (slightly) lower the costs to the person holding the shares by 
isolating that person from economic exposure to the shares.  This means that the 
incentives necessary to induce that person to vote pro-management are lower.  
In that sense, decoupling does contribute to the problem.  The legally relevant 
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222 However, there might be whole range of other reasons why parties may engage in soft 
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issue, however, is conflict of interest.  For instance, if a company gives a lot of 
work to an investment bank (and pays many fees) and the investment bank also 
happens to own shares in that company, in a hostile take-over situation the bank 
might well have an incentive to vote for the incumbent management, regardless 
of whether the bank owns the economic and the legal rights.  The relevant legal 
issue is to determine whether a shareholder is an interested party or not, an issue 
the law routinely deals with. This issue was discussed in CSX Corporation v. 
The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP.223   Although the case 
was decided on other grounds, in an obiter dicta statement, Circuit Judge Ralph 
K. Winter held as follows:  
In my view, without an agreement between the long and short parties permitting 
the long party ultimately to acquire the hedge stock or to control the short party's 
voting of it, such swaps are not a means of indirectly facilitating a control 
transaction. . . .  In my view, cash-settled total-return equity swaps do not, 
without more, render the long party a "beneficial owner" of such shares with a 
potential disclosure obligation under Section 13(d) . . .  The issue here is not fact 
specific.  Total-return cash-settled swap agreements can be expected to cause 
some party to purchase the referenced shares as a hedge.  No one questions that 
any understanding between long and short parties regarding the purchase, sale, 
retention, or voting of shares renders them a group—including the long party—
deemed to be the beneficial owner of the referenced shares purchased as a hedge 
and any other shares held by the group.  Whether, absent any such understanding, 
total-return cash-settled swaps render a long party the beneficial owner of 
referenced shares bought as a hedge by the immediate short . . . party or some 
other party down the line is a question of law not fact.224 
This analysis is correct.  Absent an agreement or understanding, being 
party to decoupling of legal and economic rights does not in itself mean that one 
party has an incentive to act in the interest of the other party.  It might be argued, 
however, that this is only true on a theoretical level—that in practice dealers 
usually vote to please their clients.  This is an empirical question, which can only 
be settled by further research.  Yet, evidence presented by the FSA (now FCA) 
and PwC in the UK suggests otherwise.225  This is not to say that disclosure of 
economic interests, is never desirable.  In bankruptcy proceedings, creditors are 
often grouped together if they share certain characteristics.  In this instance, it 
makes sense to base the group on economic ownership because creditors in the 
same group are likely to have similar interests.  However, it is worth 
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2015 IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT  229 
 
remembering that the grouping of creditors is essentially a time saving device.  
Likewise, if creditors serve on creditor committees it is useful to know about 
their economic interests.  This is because these creditors are intended to represent 
other creditors.  As is usual in agency situations, conflicts of interests need to be 
addressed.  However, the general point remains that empty creditors do not pose 
a special problem and in cases where there should be disclosure, the law already 
demands such disclosure.  
B. The Blackstone Codere CDS 
The case of the Blackstone Group, a private equity firm, and Codere, a 
Spanish gaming company, is not discussed by Hu and Black.  Yet, it is arguably 
one of the most well-known cases in relation to the ECH, particularly because it 
was parodied by the prominent US comedian Jon Stewart.226  Although the case 
did not generate much academic interest, its prominence in the main-stream 
media merits a brief discussion.  
According the Bloomberg Business,227 GSO Capital Partners LP (“GSO”), 
a unit of the Blackstone Group, bought bonds issued by Codere worth €25–€30 
million and CDSs written on these bonds.  Later, GSO acquired a €100m 
revolving loan facility to which Codere was a party.  Thereafter, GSO agreed to 
roll over the loan facility under the condition that Codere would pay the coupon 
on its bonds late thereby triggering the CDS.  Codere agreed and paid the coupon 
two days after the 30-day grace period stipulated by ISDA, which resulted “in a 
$197 million payment to holders of the swaps.  Based on a value of 54.5 cents 
on the dollar for the bonds set at an Oct. 9 auction . . . to determine the swaps 
payout, GSO would have made from 11.4 million euros to as much as 13.7 
million.”228  For some, this transaction was nothing short of legalised fraud,229 
and it seemed a clear case of empty creditors.230  Actual data on the transaction 
is hard to come by; therefore, analysis must be done on an abstract level.  
According to Blackstone, it actually helped Codere.  In response to the satire by 
Jon Stewart, Blackstone responded: 
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We love Jon Stewart and he continues to be one of the funniest people on TV.  
But the somewhat boring truth is that we cooperated with Codere and its advisors 
to save it from bankruptcy or liquidation.  We provided capital when no one else 
would, which allowed the Company to live and fight another day.231 
It is difficult to ascertain if it is true that no one else would have provided 
capital to Codere.  However, the fact remains that Blackstone did roll-over the 
loan—it provided a substantial amount of capital to a company in deep financial 
distress.  Further, the profit figure of €11.4–€13.7 million is the gross profit, not 
the net profit, as it was pointed out by the financial journalist Felix Salmon.232  
Blackstone, in all likelihood, did not get the CDS for free, but had to pay for it.  
In fact, it seems likely that Blackstone must have paid quite a lot for the CDS 
due to Codere’s difficult financial situation.  This would have reduced 
Blackstone profit on the CDS leg of the transaction quite substantially.   Even 
assuming the trade was profitable for Blackstone, it certainly was not risk-free.  
The transaction could only be implemented by Blackstone “tak[ing] a huge direct 
exposure to Codere on the other side of its trade”233 (i.e. rolling over the loan).  
Furthermore, the interesting aspect of the transaction was, as it was pointed out 
by Matt Levine, that Blackstone found a way to turn the market view of Codere’s 
default risk into cash.234  As he explains:  
 “The credit-default swaps market is a way to express in terms of money the 
market's estimate of a company's chance of default—real default, not missing a 
payment by two days—in the future.  Blackstone found a way to turn that 
expression in terms of money into money.  One day it had a CDS contract with 
a mark-to-market value of 11 million euros or whatever; the next day it had 11 
million euros.  One day the banks were taking risk on Codere's credit that had 
gone against them to the tune of 11 million euros; the next day they had no risk 
and 11 million fewer euros. The risk that they got rid of was still worth about 11 
million euros.”235 
All this makes it more likely that the true motivation behind the transaction 
was not to destroy Codere, in order to profit from the CDS but to restructure the 
debt.  The reason Codere needed to be put into bankruptcy was to deal with hold-
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out creditors.236  Felix Salmon argued that rather than being to the detriment of 
Codere, Blackstone gave the company a second chance, stating that “[f]or a piece 
of clever financial engineering, that’s an uncommonly positive societal 
outcome.”237  Another aspect of the transaction is that depending which law 
applies to the contract, the creditors who were paid late may have a claim against 
Blackstone under the doctrine of tortious interference.238  After all, Blackstone 
induced Codere to breach its contract with a third party and Blackstone had 
actual knowledge of the contract.  
C.  Regulatory Developments 
Notwithstanding the above discussion, superficially it may appear that 
regulatory developments seem to suggest that regulators, at least, take the ECH 
seriously.  For instance, since June 2009, the United Kingdom’s Disclosure 
Rules and Transparency Rules sourcebook (DTR) requires the disclosure of 
financial instruments that have a similar economic effect to that of qualifying 
financial instruments.239  Essentially, DTR 5.3.1(b) aims to catch contracts for 
differences (CfDs) and other derivatives instruments that provide the same 
economic exposure as shares.  However, in the relevant consultation the FSA 
wrote: 
[T]he key question is whether CfDs are in effect a substitute for shares so that 
disclosure of CfD positions would bring the same benefits to price formation, 
takeover situations and market confidence as MSN disclosures.  This would be 
the case where:  
• CfD positions are closed out with the underlying stock;  
• and/or CfD writers vote on behalf of CfD holders where they hedge 
their positions with the underlying stock 
 The survey carried out for us by PwC suggests that the policies and practices of 
investment banks writing CfDs do not generally operate in these ways.  But it 
also demonstrates that despite the stated—and implemented—policies of 
investment banks, holders of CfDs do sometimes approach the writers seeking 
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to exert influence on an undisclosed basis over voting rights attached to stock 
held as hedge against those contracts (it should be noted that the general policy 
of investment banks is not to vote shares in accordance with CfD holders’ 
wishes).240  
There are two things to note about this statement.  First, according to the 
survey, CfDs are not generally used to exercise influence.  Second, the FSA (now 
FCA) chose to ignore this finding of the survey in favour of anecdotal 
evidence.241  However, disclosure of CfDs is not necessarily contrary to the 
arguments in this article because disclosing a CfDs’ position means the market 
is provided with more information, which should contribute to better price 
discovery. 
Further, disclosure obligations in post-financial crisis regulations, as 
provided in Dodd-Frank Title VII in the United States or the EMIR or MiFID II 
in Europe, are aimed to improve transparency not to address the empty creditor 
problem but to address counterparty risk.242  Likewise, the EU Regulation on 
Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (EU) No 236/2012 is 
not a piece of legislation to address empty creditors.243  The regulation seems to 
be less concerned with empty creditors and more with market stability.  For 
instance, this can be seen from the dual regimes of disclosure (i.e. net short 
position of > 0.2% in eligible shares need to be disclosed ‘privately’ to the 
competent authorities) and the prohibition on naked short-selling.  Such a 
prohibition makes most sense if one is concerned with the market impact when 
the position is closed out, rather than with empty creditors.  Further, the Short 
Selling Regulation contains an exemption for market makers.  If the issues raised 
by Hu and Black were part of the motivation behind the Short Selling 
Regulation, one would not expect such an exemption to exist.  (As discussed 
above, Hu and Black are concerned with how dealers that are parties to short 
positions behave in the market, and the same reasoning applies to market makers 
as well).  Thus, in conclusion, it can be stated that, besides the first glance 
appearance, there is no broad regulatory trend to regard empty creditors or empty 
shareholders as a significant problem.   
                                                
240 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 225, at 6. 
241 Among other things, this raises the question why the FSA hired PwC to conduct the survey 
in the first place.  
242 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376; 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1; 2014 O.J. (L173) 84. 
243 See 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 ¶4, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 
2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
This article tried to show three things.  First, this article showed that the 
ECH consists of two distinct issues: the economic and the legal problem.  
Second, this article demonstrated that the economic problem is unlikely to be a 
significant issue because CDS sellers have an incentive to buy the underlying 
debt.  However, further research is necessary to get a more comprehensive 
understanding.  The introduction of reporting requirements for most derivatives 
is likely to be of great help for this research.  Third, this article argued that the 
legal problem is based on a misunderstanding of what the underlying 
assumptions of corporate law are.  According to this article, all rights that 
investors have in a company are solely based on the amount they invested.  It is 
therefore irrelevant whether an investor has a CDS position or not, and, as such, 
CDSs do not violate the background assumptions of corporate or insolvency law.  
This does not mean that one can be certain that no law or regulation, anywhere, 
is affected by empty creditors.  It means only that empty creditors are not 
contrary to the background assumption of corporate law.  All of this suggests 
that the best policy response to empty creditors is to do nothing.  If any policy 
action is needed it is probably enough to rely on the disclosure requirements for 
derivatives.  
 
 

